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The Too-Many-Minorities and
Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-
Affirmative-Action Position: From Bakke
to Grutter and Beyond
by RONALD TURNER-
I. THE INTRUDERS
At various points in time, in various spaces and places, certain
individuals and entities have looked at a university, an employer, or a
government contracting program and observed the presence of a
certain number of African-Americans, Latino/as, and other people of
color who, in the view of the observers, should not have been in those
places and spaces. Some filed lawsuits alleging that private or
governmental actors had deprived them of something to which they
were purportedly entitled, and had done so in implementing
affirmative action plans and by providing "preferential treatment" to
minorities. Allan Bakke, Brian Weber, the J.A. Croson Company,
Adarand Constructors, Inc., Cheryl Hopwood, and others have asked
courts to invalidate affirmative action measures and to grant them
what they deemed to be rightfully theirs - admission to a medical or
law school or college or job training program, or the award of a state
or federal contract. Most recently, Barbara Grutter, Jennifer Gratz,
and Patrick Hamacher pursued anti-affirmative-action lawsuits
challenging the University of Michigan's law school and
undergraduate affirmative action admissions policies, but only to the
extent that those policies considered the race (and not other
characteristics) of applicants.
* George Butler Research Professor and Professor of Law, The University of
Houston Law Center, rturner@central.uh.edu. J.D., 1984, The University of Pennsylvania
Law School; B.A., 1980, magna cum laude, Wilberforce University. The author
acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by Dean Nancy Rapoport
and the George Butler Research Fund.
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In challenging affirmative action, various litigants have invoked
the United States Constitution and federal antidiscrimination laws
and have relied on doctrinal, precedential, and policy-based
arguments. Affirmative action is unlawful and should be abolished,
they argue, because it is inconsistent with a colorblind Constitution,'
balkanizes the nation,2 is an unwarranted departure from "merit,"3
victimizes innocent whites,' stigmatizes its recipients and
beneficiaries,5 and seeks ends which can better or best be
accomplished through a class-conscious, rather than a race-conscious,
approach.6  College admissions, jobs, and government contracts
1. See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR
COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
(1992); Robert J. Corry, Affirmative Action: An Innocent Generation's Equality Sacrificed,
22 OHION.U. L. REV. 1177 (1996).
2. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993); Christo Lassiter, The New Race Cases
and the Politics of Public Policy, 12 J.L. & POL. 411 (1996).
3. See ROBERT KLITGAARD, MERIT AT THE RIGHT TAIL: EDUCATION AND
ELITE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS CHOOSING ELITES (1985); Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853
(1995). It has been argued that "merit" is a canard in that
American education is not meritocratic, and it never has been. Merit, defined as
quantifiable aptitude and achievement, is just one of the variables that decide
educational outcomes. Success in college admissions, as in almost every sphere
in life, is a function of some combination of ability, connections, persistence,
wealth, and special markers-that is, attributes valued for the difference they
make to "the mix."
Louis Menand, The Thin Envelope, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 89. See also
RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW IN THE AGE OF HYPERCAPITALISM: THE WORKER,
THE FAMILY, AND THE STATE 35 (1998) ("There is no uniformly applied merit principle
operating in American society. Instead, a merit myth is invoked when the color of the
beneficiary group starts to darken."); Leon Botstein, The Merit Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2003, at A31 (National Edition) ("universities have for too long maintained a lie about
how subjective and imprecise the assessment of merit actually is;" "[m]otivation, ambition,
curiosity, originality and the capacity to endure risk and think independently are essential
components of merit").
4. See FREDERICK R. LYNCH, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: WHITE MALES AND THE CRISIS
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991). See also Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative
Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990).
5. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(1991); Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and
Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 899 (1998); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.,
Hopwood, Bakke, and the Future of the Diversity Justification, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1,
48 (1998); Christopher T. Wonnell, Circumventing Racism: Confronting the Problem of
Affirmative Action Ideology, 1989 BYU L. REV. 95. But see JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD,
FACING UP To THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE
NATION 101 (1995) ("Overall, 55 percent of well-off blacks think affirmative action
programs help recipients, and only 4 percent think such programs hurt recipients.").
6. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial
446 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:4
Racegoating Dynamics
should go to the deserving "best," it has been urged, to those who
have the highest grade point averages and Medical College
Admissions Test (MCAT) or Law School Admissions Test (LSAT)
scores,7 or to those who are the most qualified applicants and
employees, or who have submitted the lowest bid for contracting
opportunities. For some opponents of affirmative action,
governmental programs and policies favoring minorities but not
whites are contrary to the posited narrative of individuals "making it
on their own."'
Lying beneath the surface and within the body of the anti-
affirmative-action position is the notion that something is out of place
and is not as it should be. More specifically, and frankly, in certain
instances affirmative action challenges have rested on and reflected
the views that: (1) there are too many minorities in a school or
contracting program or job classification; and (2) the presence of
minority beneficiaries of affirmative action is the reason that
nonminorities did not receive (in their view, were improperly denied)
a position or contract. The first (and historically reoccurring) view,9
which I call the "too-many-minorities dimension," rests on and is
grounded in the concern that some number of people of color have
Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2001).
7. Test scores and grades are seemingly objective measures of merit in the
minds of a public that has long prided itself on the belief that hard work and
determination should be rewarded. There is a disquieting incongruity to
distributing scarce resources of educational opportunity to some who, by
those objective standards, appear to be less deserving.
Linda F. Wightman, The Role of Standardized Admission Tests in the Debate about Merit,
Academic Standards, and Affirmative Action, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 90, 96 (2000).
8. Of course, whites have historically benefited from affirmative action and
preferential treatment. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT
REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 143 (2000). "Slavery and legal segregation
created preferences for whites in access to jobs, education, politics, and housing. The
long-term impact of such preferences for ordinary whites accounts for a substantial
proportion of the income and wealth differential between black and white Americans
today." Id. at 180.
9. "[fin 1876... whites began to fear that newly freed blacks were getting more than
a token share of societal power and benefits under Reconstruction-era civil rights laws and
constitutional amendments." Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But is She
a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
327, 373 (1994). Coke argues that the "constriction of affirmative action
programs.., parallels a similar phenomenon that occurred exactly a century ago during
the waning years of Reconstruction." Id. See also ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF
AMERICAN FREEDOM 107 (1998) (noting that reconstruction era laws and constitutional
amendments aroused bitter opposition); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)
(noting that "there must be some stage in the progress" of an African-American's
"elevation when he ... ceases to be the special favorite of the laws").
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been illegitimately afforded opportunities and have been unfairly if
not illegally admitted to college or medical or law school while more
deserving and intelligent white applicants were rejected." Subscribers
to this position also believe that certain employment opportunities
were "given" to minorities, or minority businesses received contracts
that should have been awarded to nonminority businesses. In all of
these settings the presence of "too many" minorities is a "problem,"
the negative manifestations of which assertedly serve to pollute and
weaken institutions and programs."
An example of the too-many-minorities view is found in Richard
Posner's claim that the use of the Socratic method "is in decline in
many law schools. .. due in part to affirmative action, which, virtually
by definition, entails the admission of minority students less qualified
on average than the law school's nonminority students, hence more
likely to be embarrassed by the 'cold call' method of Socratic
teaching.' 1 2 Robert Bork contends that
[a]ffirmative action is being pressed into areas where it will
prove positively dangerous. "The application of the principles
of affirmative action to medical education is significant,
implying, as it does, that their proponents' ideological
10. [T]he plain fact is that access to elite higher education dramatically enhances
one's chances to acquire influence in our putatively meritocratic society.
Competition for a relatively few seats at the table of power is keen, and many
chafe at the idea of their child's place being taken by someone
"undeserving."
GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 131-32 (2002). Richard
Herrnstein and Charles Murray, discussing "racial clashes" on college campuses, have
posited that
a plausible explanation is that whites resent blacks, who are in fact getting a large
edge in the admissions process and often in scholarship assistance and many of
whom, as whites look around their own campus and others, "don't belong there"
academically. Some whites begin to act out these resentments. Blacks perceive
the same disproportions and resentments, then conclude that the college
environment is hostile to them.
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 472-73 (1994).
11. See DINESH D'SOUzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY 322 (1995) ("[TJhe institutionalization of racial preferences in college
admissions.., and job hiring virtually guarantees that .. . the average black will not be as
well qualified as the average white."); DAVID DUKE, MY AWAKENING 167 (2002)
("affirmative action programs ruined schools .... ).
12. Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1647, 1647 (1993).
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
293 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he best first-year legal education today is probably better than
it was in the 1950s," and that "[t]his is true even though some inroads into quality have
been made by affirmative action at both the student and faculty levels...").
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commitment makes them willing to risk the graduation of
incompetent physicians." The desire to graduate as many
minority students as possible, who are often admitted with
inadequate qualifications, creates a strong motivation for the
administration to lower standards.1 3
For Professor Lino Graglia, the problem is the
overrepresentation (too many), and not the underrepresentation, of
(in his view) African-Americans with lower IQ's' in institutions of
higher education. 5
The second and related dynamic, that affirmative action results
in the displacement of whites 6 and is the reason whites did not receive
certain positions or contracts, is what I call "racegoating." Consider,
in this regard, the following statement by a white male interviewed as
13. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE 234 (1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting Albert S. Braverman
& Brian Anziska, Challenges to Science and Authority in Contemporary Medical
Education, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS (Summer 1994) at 14).
14. In the early 1900s German psychologist William Stern "coined the term
intelligence quotient," a number arrived at by "dividing the intelligence age by the
chronological age to create a ratio." EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK:
EUGENICS AND AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 82 (2003). For an
account of the history of the development of intelligence tests and the relationship of such
tests to eugenics, see id. at 76-85.
15. See Lino Graglia, The "Affirmative Action" Fraud, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 31, 33 (1998); Lino Graglia, "Hate Speech" Codes and "Political
Correctness": Fruit of "Affirmative Action," 23 N. KY. L. REV. 505, 511-12 (1996). Graglia
has cited The Bell Curve in support of his too-many-blacks argument. See Lino Graglia,
"Affirmative Action," Past, Present, and Future, 22 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 1207, 1213-14
(1996); HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 10. According to The Bell Curve, the black
mean in IQ test scores (85) is lower than the white mean score (100) by one standard
deviation. Id. at 276. And, the authors of The Bell Curve claimed, the mean IQ of "East
Asians" (Japanese, Chinese, and "perhaps also Koreans") is higher than that of white
Americans by a range of a few points to a maximum of ten points. Id. at 269, 272-73. For
discussion and criticism of The Bell Curve, see THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE,
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1995).
16. On this point, a recent study focusing on matriculants at five selective institutions
of higher education posited that, "if affirmative action is not used, the overall white
probability of admission would rise by only one and one-half percentage points: from 25
percent to roughly 26.5 percent." WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF
THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 36 (1998). One analyst has written that "this finding should not
appear so shocking, as the reason for the limited increase in admissions probability is that
the number of students admitted through preferences is relatively small, while the number
of currently rejected white (and black) students is very high indeed." Michael Selmi, The
Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 708 (1999). See also Goodwin Liu, The
Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1045, 1093 (2002) (1.5 percent of white applicants are actually displaced by the
beneficiaries of affirmative action).
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part of a study of the racial views of upper-income white men:
I feel that I am definitely becoming discriminated against
because I am white. For me, I mean, all the affirmative action
things that go on make it harder for me to get a job in a
governmental agency than for a Latino or African American or
any other ethnic. It's harder for me than any other group ....
Quite a few years ago.., when I was applying to colleges, if a
kid was black, he didn't have to get as good grades as I did
because the colleges were just trying to fill the gap, so they had
to fill the minority gaps. So it definitely hurt me there .... If
you just watch the news, half of the news anchors, everybody, is
represented .... Just look at the news anchors themselves.
They always try to have a woman, a black, a Latino, Asians.
They never have white males.'7
Going beyond notice of and concern about too many minorities,
racegoating provides a more specific explanation/excuse for those
who believe that they lost out to undeserving minorities and are the
"victims" of affirmative action.'8 One thus hears the claim that whites
have unfairly lost jobs and university admissions and scholarships to
unqualified minorities. 9 A prominent example of this dynamic is the
17. JOE FEAGIN & EILEEN O'BRIEN, WHITE MEN ON RACE: POWER, PRIVILEGE,
AND THE SHAPING OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS 85 (2003) (ellipses in original).
18. Opposition to affirmative action, "in the form of white applicants... who argue
that their rightful places at the top schools are being given to black and Hispanic students
of lesser ability, has been gaining momentum once again." Jacques Steinberg, Affirmative
Action Faces a New Wave of Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at 3 (National Edition).
19. See D'SOUZA, supra note 11, at 10 (quoting anonymous flier at the University of
California at Berkeley: "When I see you in class it bugs the hell out of me because you're
taking the seat of someone qualified."); LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE
MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING
DEMOCRACY 267-68 (2002) (noting that persons not admitted to public universities
"conclude that unqualified black and brown students are taking the place of more
qualified white applicants"); HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 470 ("some
number of white students are denied places at universities they could otherwise have won,
because of affirmative action"); MANNING MARABLE, THE GREAT WELLS OF
DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF RACE IN AMERICAN LIFE 126 (2002) (recounting that
after author gave speech on racial issues a "white student launched into an attack on
affirmative action" and "insisted that both he and many of his friends had lost scholarships
and jobs to unqualified minorities").
My colleague, Sidney Buchanan, has pointed out the red herring of the
unqualified minority. "No responsible person argues that affirmative action should be
used to accept applicants who are not qualified for the positions they seek," and "an
argument against affirmative action that is based on the fear of a flood of incompetent or
marginally competent applicants should be rejected as a red herring that obscures debate
on the serious and legitimate issues truly generated by the operation of affirmative action
plans in their modern form." Sidney Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of
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"white hands commercial" run by North Carolina Senator Jesse
Helms in his United States Senate campaign against challenger
Harvey Gantt (who happens to be an African-American). As a pair
of white hands crumple a rejection letter from an employer, a voice
says, "You needed that job and you were the best qualified. But they
had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really
fair? Harvey Gantt says it is. '
This criticism of affirmative action as unfair to whites is a
prominent one.' In the words of David Duke, affirmative action is
"grossly unfair to millions of Whites, who are denied jobs,
promotions, scholarships, [and] college and graduate admissions" and
"has a nefarious impact on society as a whole."
2
The too-many-minorities and racegoating dynamics of the anti-
affirmative-action position are the foci of this article. The discussion
proceeds as follows. Part II examines two seminal decisions by the
United States Supreme Court - Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke2 ' and United Steelworkers v. Weber 4- each validating certain
consideration and uses of race in higher education and employment.
Part III turns to subsequent Supreme Court and court of appeals
cases wherein constitutional challenges to affirmative action measures
were successful, and sets the stage for the discussion in Part IV - the
Justice, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 151 (2002).
20. Ed Timms & Doug J. Swanson, Racial Politics Surging as Economy Declines,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 1990, at 1A (quoting commercial). In a recent column
one commentator argued that the Helms commercial "encouraged white constituents who
had experienced job loss or professional disappointment to blame affirmative action. The
message was that antiwhite discrimination was the only possible explanation when a black
applicant was chosen over a white person." Brent Staples, Americans Have a Cool Debate
About a Hot-Button Topic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, Weekly at 12 (National Edition).
21. See Troy Duster, Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the California
Strategy, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111, 112 (Robert Post
& Michael Rogin eds., 1998) ("the trump card in the deck, the perfect squelch, and the
most effective and frequently cited attack [on affirmative action] revolves around the idea
of fairness-and most particularly, around a specific rendition of fairness to the
individual"). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) ("Fairness in individual competition for opportunities ... is a
widely cherished American ethic. Indeed, in a broader sense, an underlying assumption of
the rule of law is the worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the
individual."). For additional discussion of affirmative action and the fairness issue, see
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
409-26 (2000).
22. DUKE, supra note 11, at 164.
23. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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Supreme Court's 2003 decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger25 and Gratz v.
Bollinger6 and the Court's validation and invalidation of the
University of Michigan's law school and undergraduate admissions
programs, respectively. Part V, noting that the too-many-minorities
and racegoating dynamics discussed herein continue to exist
notwithstanding the Court's decisions, looks to the next generation
and phase of anti-affirmative-action efforts. Finally, this article
concludes with closing comments on the persistence of the too-many-
minorities and racegoating dynamics of the ongoing affirmative action
debate.
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL DECISIONS
A. Bakke
The too-many-minorities and/or racegoating dynamics of the
anti-affirmative-action position can be found in cases brought to and
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.27 The seminal
case involved Allan Bakke's efforts to gain admission to the
University of California at Davis medical school. In 1973, Bakke, a
white male,28 applied for admission to the school. When his
application was rejected, Bakke wrote a letter to the chair of the
admissions committee and complained that the school's special
admissions program, which reserved sixteen of one hundred seats for
special admissions applicants, constituted a racial and ethnic quota.29
25. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
26. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
27. This article does not focus on the affirmative action obligations mandated by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. For a discussion of affirmative action in that
area of the law, see GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 85-
155 (2000).
28. "He stood just under six feet tall, with blond hair, blue eyes, and the 'Teutonic'
appearance of his Norwegian ancestors." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 455 (1994).
29. Under the medical school's general admissions program, applicants with overall
grade point averages under 2.5 (on a 4.0 scale) were summarily rejected. One of six
applicants received invitations for personal interviews and were rated on a scale of 1 to
100 by interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. That rating
took into account the interviewer's evaluations of the applicants, the applicant's overall
GPA and specific GPA in science courses, MCAT scores, letters of recommendations,
extracurricular activities, and other information. A benchmark score was reached by
adding together the ratings, and the committee then reviewed the files and scores of
applicants and extended admission offers on a rolling basis. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,274 (1978).
[Vol. 30:4
Racegoating Dynamics
Applying again in 1974, Bakke was interviewed by the
admissions committee chair (the same person who had received
Bakke's 1973 letter of complaint). Subsequent to that interview the
chair concluded that Bakke was "rather limited in his approach" to
the medical profession's problems and "found disturbing Bakke's
very definite opinions which were based more on his personal
viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem., 3' Although he
received 549 of a possible 600 points, Bakke's application was
rejected31 (as were his applications to twelve other medical schools,
many concerned about his age, 33).2 Some persons applying under
the special admissions program in 1973 and 1974 "were admitted
under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT scores,
and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's. '
Approximately fifty white applicants with benchmark scores higher
than Bakke's were not admitted, whites with lower scores were
admitted, individuals with scores similar to Bakke's were admitted
through the special admissions program, 4 and under the medical
school dean's admissions program "white children of politically well-
connected university supporters or substantial financial contributors
were admitted in spite of being less qualified than other applicants."35
Contending that the special admissions program excluded him
because of his race, and assisted by an admissions officer at the Davis
medical school,36 Bakke brought a lawsuit against the medical school.
Under the special admissions program, applicable in 1973 to the "economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged" and in 1974 to members of minority groups (persons
who were Black, Chicano, Asian, and American Indian), the minimum 2.5 GPA
requirement did not apply. One in five special admissions applicants were invited for
interviews, benchmark scores were assigned, and the top choices of the special admissions
committee were presented to the general committee. Special candidates were not
compared with or against general candidates. See id. at 274-75.
30. Id. at 277.
31. See id.
32. JEFFRIES, supra note 28, at 455 (noting "[h]is age was a problem. At thirty-three,
some thought him too old to begin the long course of study required to become a
doctor."). See also STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 413 (1997) (opining "age may have been
Bakke's biggest handicap"); Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action
Retrospective, 87 GEO. L.J. 981, 985 (1999).
33. 438 U.S. at 277 (footnote omitted).
34. See Selmi, supra note 32, at 986.
35. CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 45 (1997) (footnote omitted).
36. The admissions officer was aware of Bakke's view that he had been adversely
impacted by the special admissions program and provided Bakke with information and the
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke37 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the medical
school's special admissions program discriminated on the basis of
race.38 Justice Powell concluded that the special admissions program
was unlawful and that Bakke should be admitted. In Powell's words:
[I]t is evident that the Davis special admissions program
involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before
countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants who are not
Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a
specific percentage of seats in an entering class. No matter how
strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular,
including their own potential for contribution to educational
diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with
applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions
seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the
opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.40
To the extent that the medical school's
name of a lawyer involved in an anti-affirmative-action suit against the City of San
Francisco, California. See Selmi, supra note 32, at 986 (citing JOEL DREYFUSS &
CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THEPOLITICS OFINEQUALITY 22 (1979)).
Noting the issue of the assistance provided to affirmative action challengers by
institutional representatives, Jennifer Hochschild has asked:
How many whites or men were told by admissions officers or personnel directors
that they would have been admitted or hired were it not for affirmative action
procedures? After all, that is an easy and mutually gratifying response from a
gatekeeper to an angry or disappointed candidate-even to many such candidates
in a row, so long as each is addressed in the absence of the others. To my
knowledge, no one has conducted research to document the ways in which
affirmative action is presented to nonminorities denied jobs or admission or
promotion.
Jennifer Hochschild, Affirmative Action as Culture War, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION,
supra note 21, at 348.
37. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
38. This question was before the Court but was not answered in DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). There the Court agreed to review a judgment by the
Washington Supreme Court holding that the University of Washington Law School could
lawfully consider the racial and ethnic backgrounds of applicants in its selection of
students. The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided that the case was moot
because DeFunis would complete his law school studies regardless of the Court's decision.
In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that "at least as respects Indians, blacks, and Chicanos-
as well as those from Asian cultures-I think a separate classification of these applicants is
warranted, lest race be a subtle force in eliminating minority members because of cultural
differences." Id. at 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting). On Justice Douglas's position in
DeFunis, see BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS 466-68 (2003).
40. 438 U.S. at 319-20.
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purpose is to assure within its student body some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or
ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not
as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of
any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake.'
Given the school's concession that it could not prove that, but for
the special admissions program, Bakke would never have been
selected, the Court ordered his admission: "[T]here is no question as
to the sole reason for [Bakke's] rejection - purposeful racial
discrimination in the form of the special admissions program.' 2
In a separate judgment the Court held that race could be one of a
number of factors considered in the admissions process. This
judgment was set forth in Part V-C of Justice Powell's opinion,
wherein he wrote that "the State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin."' 3
Powell cited the Harvard College program as an "illuminating
example" of an admissions program which properly took race into
account. "In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background
may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for
the available seats."" Race and other factors - "exceptional personal
talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential,
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other
qualifications deemed important" - could be considered by a
university in making its admissions determinations.45 As Justice
Brennan's separate opinion (joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun) made clear, Powell "agree[s] that some uses of race in
university admissions are permissible and, therefore, he joins with us
to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it
prohibits the university from establishing race-conscious programs in
the future."46
41. Id. at 307.
42. Id. at 320 n.54.
43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 317 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. See also id. at 321-24 (appendix setting forth the Harvard program).
46. Id. at 326 (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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Writing only for himself in Part IV-D of his Bakke opinion,
Justice Powell expressed his view that "the attainment of a diverse
student body ... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education. ' 47 Referring to the First Amendment
and noting the importance of academic freedom, Powell wrote that
"[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body."' Diversity in
medical education is important, Powell opined, since a qualified
student "with a particular background ... may bring to a professional
school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the
training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render
with understanding their vital service to humanity.0 9 He cautioned,
however, that ethnic diversity was only one of a "range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogeneous student body"5 and that "constitutional limitations
part).
47. Id. at 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.). Powell "left incomplete what he meant by
diversity and why he believed diversity was so important." Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, What Exactly is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L, REV. 1149, 1150 (2003) (footnote
omitted). Defining racial diversity conceptually, Carbado and Gulati have written that
racial diversity conveys the idea that a relationship exists between race and social
experiences, on the one hand, and knowledge and practices, on the other.
Central to racial diversity, then, is the notion that how we experience, think
about, and conduct ourselves in society is shaped, though not determined, by our
race.
Id. at 1153-54. Diversity also performs seven functions: inclusion, social meaning,
citizenship, belonging, colorblindness, speech, and institutional culture. See id. at 1154-64.
See also PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 7, 19-39 (2003) (defining diversity
"as those differences in values, attributes, or activities among individuals or groups that a
particular society deems salient to the social status or behavior of those individuals or
groups" and discussing taxonomies, sources, and legal structures of diversity).
48. 438 U.S. at 312. In support of this point Justice Powell quoted from a 1957
concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957):
It is the purpose of a university to provide an atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which
there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study.
Id. at 263.
49. 438 U.S. at 314 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. Scholars have agreed with Powell that "diversity extends well beyond race
and encompasses differences in background, socioeconomic status, country or region of
birth, point of view, and religion." BOWEN & BOK, supra note 16, at 219 (footnote
omitted). It has been noted, however, that college and university pursuit of diversity does
not, as a practical matter, extend to all differences as "institutions are committed to
diversity, but only to a certain degree and of a certain kind." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
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protecting individual rights may not be disregarded."5'
B. Weber
In 1974, as Allan Bakke sought admission to medical school,
Brian Weber sought admission to an in-plant training program run by
his employer, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, and his
union, the United Steelworkers of America. As provided in an
affirmative action program contained in a collective bargaining
agreement between Kaiser and the Steelworkers, African-American
employees would receive fifty percent of training program openings
until the percentage of black craftworkers in the employer's
Gramercy, Louisiana facility (1.83 percent prior to 1974) was
commensurate with the percentage of African-Americans in the local
labor force (approximately 39 percent) 2 In 1974 thirteen employees,
seven black and six white, were selected for the program; the most
senior black worker selected had less seniority than several white
workers who were denied admission. Weber, one of the rejected
white workers, filed a class action against the employer and the union
alleging that the affirmative action program preferred junior black
workers to similarly situated white workers in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).53
By a vote of 5-2, the Supreme Court in Steelworkers v. Weber'
held that the affirmative action plan did not violate Title VII. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court noted that Weber's argument that
the plan violated Sections 703(a) and 703(d) of Title VII5 was "not
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 195 (2003). "They do not make special efforts to include
students who collect Elvis Presley memorabilia, eat mostly potato chips, despise America,
smell bad, adore Westerns, or have low SATs." Id.
51. 438 U.S. at 314.
52. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,198-99 (1979).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Weber believed that the affirmative action program was
"not only illegal, but unfair." Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169,
1200 (2000) (quoting Speaking of Race, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 16, 1993, at A7 (quoting
Brian Weber)).
54. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate in the
consideration or decision of the case. Philip Frickey reports that "Justice Powell had been
ill during the oral argument and chose not to participate" and that Justice Stevens recused
himself "because he had represented Kaiser while he was a private attorney in Chicago."
Frickey, supra note 53, at 1175 (footnotes omitted).
55. Section 703(a) provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 703(d) provides that it is
unlawful for an "employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
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without force."56 But, Brennan reasoned, Weber's "reliance upon a
literal construction" of Title VII was "misplaced" as it was a
"familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit nor within the intention of the makers." The prohibition
against racial discrimination ... must therefore be read against
the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the
57historical context from which the Act arose.
Turning to and relying on Title VII's legislative history,"
Brennan found that the purpose of the statute was "to open equal
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have
been traditionally closed to them,"" and concluded that "an
interpretation of the sections that forbade all race-conscious
affirmative action would bring about an end completely at variance
with the purpose of the statute and must be rejected." 60 Brennan
controlling.., on-the-job programs to discriminate against any individual because of his
race ... ." Id. at Section 2000e-2(d).
56. 443 U.S. at 201.
57. Id. (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
58. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that the legislative history showed that
affirmative action was not permitted by Title VII. Id. at 230-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For an analysis of Rehnquist's argument, see Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast,
The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1524 (2003).
One commentator has argued that legislative history did not support the majority
or the dissent:
[W]hether or not the members of Congress thought of voluntary affirmative
action, they did not discuss the issue. That being so, it is difficult for me to
understand how either the majority or the dissent found much solace in the
history. Justice Rehnquist stated, on the one hand, that Congress never thought
about the matter; on the other hand, the justice was convinced the history
rejected affirmative action . . .. I fail to see how the legislative history can lead
someone to both of Rehnquist's conclusions-that Congress did not deal with
affirmative action and that the Congress clearly rejected it.
For the majority, Justice Brennan also overstates enormously the meaning of
the legislative history. The truth is, Congress did not discuss or debate the
issue ....
See George Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise in
Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 66-67 (1980).
59. 443 U.S. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 10 Cong. Rec. 6548
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). That African-Americans had been excluded from
craft jobs at Kaiser was not in dispute. "Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial
grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice."
Id. at 198 n.1.
60. Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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continued:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's
concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to
improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the
American dream for so long ... constituted the first legislative
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to
abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.61
Justice Brennan also concluded that Section 703(j) of Title VII
did not prohibit affirmative action.62 Section 703(j)'s statement that
employers are not required to engage in affirmative action "does not
state that 'nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit'
voluntary affirmative action efforts to correct racial imbalances. The
natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary
race-conscious affirmative action. ' ,63  Had Congress chosen such
action, Brennan wrote, it would have mandated that the statute
"would not require or permit racially preferential integration
efforts. 64  While the Court did not definitively define the line
between permissible and unlawful affirmative action plans, it
concluded that the Kaiser-Steelworkers plan did not violate Title
VII 6 and validated the voluntary use of affirmative action in the
61. Id. at 204 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although he
continues to believe that he should have prevailed in his lawsuit, Brian Weber is cognizant
of the existence of racial exclusion and hierarchy. He has remarked that he learned "that
there's this class of people-females and minorities-who haven't been given the same
opportunity. Theoretically, I would like to see it where no one would be given
preferences. But they didn't start from the same level playing field. And understanding
that, I've become more supportive of affirmative action programs." Frickey, supra note
53, at 1201 (quoting Speaking of Race, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 16, 1993, at A7 (quoting
Brian Weber)).
62. That section provides that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to
require any employer ... to grant preferential treatment" to any group "on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the. .. percentage of any race ... employed by
an employer .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
63. 443 U.S. at 206.
64. Id. at 205.
65. The Court held that, for three reasons, the plan was lawful. First, the "purposes
of the plan mirror those of the statute" in that the plan was "designed to break down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" and was "structured to open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."
Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks and citation and footnote omitted). Second, "the plan
does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees" as it did not require
the firing of white employees who would be replaced by black workers and did not "create
an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees" as half the program's trainees
would be white. Id. Third, the plan was temporary, and was "not intended to maintain
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workplace.66
For subscribers to the anti-affirmative-action position, Bakke and
Weber were significant defeats. Both rulings allowed decision-makers
to consider race when choosing who would and who would not be
admitted to a professional school or a job training program. Both
rulings made it clear that certain forms of race-consciousness were
not prohibited by law. Both rulings troubled those who were
concerned that minorities were where they had no right to be and had
snatched opportunity from and out of the hands of nonminorities.
And both rulings were on the minds of-and provided prominent
targets for-organized and committed individuals and groups who were
not willing to accept the Court's decisions as the last words on the
subject.67
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance," and would "end as
soon as the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates
the percentage of blacks in the local labor force." Id. at 208-09 (citation omitted).
For an example of an employer's voluntary affirmative action plan failing to meet
the Weber standards, see Taxman v. Board. of Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that affirmative action plan adopted for purpose of
promoting racial diversity and not to remedy past or present discrimination unnecessarily
trammeled the interests of nonminorities and violated Title VII).
66. In a later ruling the Court reaffirmed Weber and rejected a male employee's claim
that the promotion of a female employee over him pursuant to a voluntary affirmative
action plan violated Title VII. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480
U.S. 616 (1987). In a dissent calling for the overruling of Weber, Justice Scalia (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist) argued that Weber disregarded and rewrote the text of Title VII.
Concerned that affirmative action will lead to an influx of the less qualified and minimally
qualified into the nation's workplaces, Scalia closed his dissent with the following
observations:
It is unlikely that today's result will be displeasing to politically elected
officials, to whom it provides the means of quickly accommodating the demands
of organized groups to achieve concrete, numerical improvement in the
economic status of particular constituencies. Nor will it displease the world of
corporate and governmental employers.., for whom the cost of hiring less
qualified workers is often substantially less-and infinitely more predictable-than
the cost of litigating Title VII cases and of seeking to convince federal agencies
by nonnumerical means that no discrimination exists. In fact, the only losers in
the process are the Johnsons of the country, for whom Title VII has been not
merely repealed but actually inverted. The irony is that these individuals-
predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer this injustice at the
hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the politically
impotent ....
Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY: AN ORGANIZED
CHALLENGE To RACIAL AND GENDER JUSTICE (2003). Cokorinos identifies five
organizations opposed to and actively working against affirmative action: the American
Civil Rights Institute, the Center for Equal Opportunity, the Center for Individual Rights,
the Institute for Justice, and the Civil Rights Practice Group of the Federalist Society. Id.
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III. THE ANTI-AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION DECISIONS
A. Croson
Opponents of affirmative action continued to press their case
and ultimately achieved significant victories. City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Company,' decided in 1989, held that the City of Richmond,
Virginia's affirmative action program requiring contractors to
subcontract at least thirty percent of construction contracts to
minority business enterprises (MBEs)69 violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy, concluded
that the program "denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their
race" and could not survive strict scrutiny review (a position also
taken by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion)." Thus, for the first
time, a majority of the Court applied strict scrutiny in assessing the
constitutionality of a voluntary affirmative action plan, and required
that the plan be justified by a compelling governmental interest (the
remediation of past discrimination) effectuated by narrowly tailored
means.
72
Strict scrutiny review was necessary, Justice O'Connor stated,
because of the number of African-Americans in Richmond and on
that city's council:
at 13. He also notes that several foundations, including the Lynne and Harry Bradley
Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation, "carry on long-range planning and
sustained campaigns on key issues" "essential to the opposition to diversity." Id. at 12.
68. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
69. An MBE was defined as a "business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is
owned and controlled ... by minority group members," with those members defined as
"[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id. at 478. In promulgating and implementing the program, the city
relied on a study showing that the population of Richmond was fifty percent African-
American and that only .67 percent of the city's prime construction contracts had been
awarded to MBEs in the period between 1978 and 1983. Id. at 479-80.
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
71. 488 U.S. at 493; id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. A plurality of the Court had applied strict scrutiny in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Holding that a collectively-bargained affirmative-action
layoff provision was unconstitutional, the Court determined that the challenged provision
could not withstand strict scrutiny review. In so holding, the plurality opined that while
remedying particularized findings of discrimination would be a compelling governmental
interest, "[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy ." Id. at 275.
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In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the
population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on
the city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political
majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority
based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would
seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened
judicial scrutiny in this case ......
This remarkable too-many-blacks observation"4 and the "facile
nature of the majority's assumption that elected officials' voting
decisions are based on the color of their skins"75 was rejected by a
dissenting Justice Marshall (lauded elsewhere by Justice O'Connor
for bringing a special perspective to the Court).76
The majority's view that remedial measures undertaken by
municipalities with black leadership must face a stiffer test of
Equal Protection Clause scrutiny than remedial measures
undertaken by municipalities with white leadership implies a
lack of political maturity on the part of this Nation's elected
minority officials that is totally unwarranted. Such insulting
judgments have no place in constitutional jurisprudence.77
Justice O'Connor determined that the Richmond set-aside plan
was constitutionally deficient because the "30% quota cannot in any
realistic sense be tied to any injury suffered by anyone. '
Acknowledging "that the sorry history of both private and public
discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of
opportunities for black entrepreneurs," she concluded that that fact,
"standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of
public contracts in Richmond, Virginia."79  Past societal
discrimination as a basis for racial preferences was not enough, for it
73. 488 U.S. at 495-96 (citation omitted).
74. "O'Connor seems to think that the Richmond set-aside program reflects nothing
more than the use of political power by a black-majority city council to 'disadvantage a
minority'-yet she refuses to consider that the absence of contracts to blacks in the past
may reflect the previous domination of city government by whites." ERIC FONER, WHO
OWNS HISTORY?: RETHINKING THE PAST IN A CHANGING WORLD 187 (2002).
75. 488 U.S. at 554 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 132-38 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
77. 488 U.S. at 555 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 499.
79. Id.
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would
open the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for
every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal
citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal
opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of
shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims
of past wrongs.8°
Nor was the plan narrowly tailored, O'Connor continued, as it
did not appear that Richmond considered race-neutral means to
increase MBE participation in contracting with the city, and the thirty
percent set-aside "cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal,
except perhaps outright racial balancing. It rests upon the completely
unrealistic assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in
lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population."81
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that "there is only
one circumstance in which the States may act by race to undo the
effects of past discrimination: where that is necessary to eliminate
their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification. '
Individuals are harmed by benign racial quotas, he wrote, and have a
constitutional right to consideration on the merits and in a racially
neutral manner. In taking this position, Justice Scalia was not blind to
the fact that African-Americans have experienced and suffered from
discrimination:
It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered
discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed at other
racial groups. But those who believe that racial preferences can
help to "even the score" display, and reinforce, a manner of
thinking by race that was the source of the injustice and that
will, if it endures within our society, be the source of more
injustice still. The relevant proposition is not that it was blacks,
or Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was
individual men and women, "created equal," who were
80. Id. at 505-06.
81. Id. at 507 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As for race-neutral
measures O'Connor advised that the city could simplify its bidding procedures, relax its
bonding requirements, and provide training and financial assistance for entrepreneurs
without regard to race. Id. at 509-10.
82. Id. at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia would
allow states and localities to only consider race in emergencies "rising to the level of
imminent danger to life and limb" such as prison riots requiring the segregation of
inmates. Id. at 521.
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discriminated against. And the relevant resolve is that that
should never happen again. Racial preferences appear to "even
the score" (in some small degree) only if one embraces the
proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided
into races, making it right that an injustice rendered in the past
to a black man should be compensated for by discriminating
against a white. Nothing is worth that embrace ....
B. Adarand
Thereafter, in 1995, the Court issued its decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. Adarand Constructors, Inc. was not
chosen to perform the subcontract for construction work, a
subcontract awarded instead to Gonzalez Construction Company,
even though Adarand had submitted the low bid. 84 In response,
Adarand challenged a federal statute requiring that "not less than ten
percent" of United States Department of Transportation (DOT)
appropriations "shall be expended with small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals;" such disadvantaged individuals were presumed to be
African-American, Hispanic, Native-American, Asian-Pacific-
American, or some other minority.85 According to Adarand, this
presumption constituted unlawful racial discrimination by the federal
government in violation of the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
A closely divided Court held that the federal government's
program had to be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard of
review and remanded the case to the lower courts for further
consideration. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice O'Connor
reviewed several Court decisions leading up to its decision in Croson'
and gleaned three propositions from those cases: (1) skepticism,8 (2)
consistency,89 and (3) congruence.9" "Taken together, these three
83. Id. at 527-28.
84. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
85. See id. See also Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987); 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2), (3).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law").
87. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-22 (referring to and discussing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986); and other decisions.)
88. "Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination." Id. at 223 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
89. The "standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on
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propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race,
has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. '
Accordingly, the Court held "that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests."92  Such
scrutiny is not "strict in theory but fatal in fact," O'Connor cautioned,
because "government is not disqualified from acting in response to"
racial discrimination.93 Whether the program challenged by Adarand
could withstand strict scrutiny was a question for the lower courts to
address on remand.4
Justices Scalia and Thomas, both advocates of originalist and
traditionalist constructions of the Constitution,95 issued concurring
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification ... i.e., all racial
classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized."
Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
90. "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 227 (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
Metro Broadcasting held that benign racial classifications by federal government actors
were subject to intermediate scrutiny and were permissible if they served important
governmental objectives and were substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. See 497 U.S. at 564-65. The Adarand Court concluded that this intermediate
scrutiny standard undermined the principles of skepticism, consistency, and congruence
set out in the Court's opinion. See 515 U.S. at 227.
93. Id. at 237 (citation omitted).
94. On remand the district court concluded that the DOT program could not survive
strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997).
That judgment was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
on the ground that Adarand had been certified as a disadvantaged business enterprise.
169 F.3d 1292 (1999). The Tenth Circuit's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court
because of questions concerning the validity of that certification. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000) (per curiam). When the case came back
again to the Court after another remand, all nine justices agreed that the Court would not
consider the case because Adarand lacked standing to challenge the DOT program.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). Thus, after years of litigation,
Adarand did not receive a final or favorable ruling on its claim.
95. Believing that "[a] provision of the Constitution... does not mean one thing at
one time and an entirely different thing at another time," Home Building and Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-49 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting), "[o]riginalism is the
idea that the words of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by
the ratifying public at the time of the enactment." Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and
the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998). Originalists
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opinions in Adarand setting forth their anti-affirmative-action views.'
believe that "the meaning of the Constitution (or of its individual clauses) was fixed at the
moment of its adoption, and that the task of interpretation is accordingly to ascertain that
meaning and apply it to the issue at hand." JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1996). While noting
"that in a crunch I may prove to be a faint-hearted originalist," Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989), Scalia has written that
"the Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is... that between original
meaning (whether derived from Framers' intent or not) and current meaning." ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Amy
Gutmann, ed., 1997). An example of Justice Thomas's originalism is found in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995), wherein he argued
that Congress did not have the authority to regulate agriculture or manufacturing because
"[alt the time the original Constitution was ratified ... the term 'commerce' was used in
contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture."
In addition to originalism, Justice Scalia has employed a traditionalist
methodology in deciding constitutional issues. See e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the Court should not invalidate a practice that
"'bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use
that dates back to the beginning of the Republic."' (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of
Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting))); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
127-28 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (in assessing constitutionality of state action the
Court should "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified"). For analysis of Scalia's
traditionalism, see Ronald Turner, Were Separate-but-Equal and Antimiscegenation Laws
Constitutional?: Applying Scalian Traditionalism to Brown and Loving, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 285 (2003).
Traditionalism should not be confused with originalism for, unlike traditionalism,
originalism "draws its normative authority not from historical practice but from a social
contract theory of precommitment by the American people." John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl
J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV.
1211, 1241 (1998).
96. Conspicuously absent from Scalia's and Thomas' analysis is any recognition of
and grappling with the fact that "before, during, and after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment" Congress "expressly refer[red] to color in the allotment of
federal benefits." Jeb Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 431 (1997).
Eric Schnapper has written that "[firom the closing days of the Civil War until the
end of civilian Reconstruction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social
welfare programs whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks." Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L.
REV. 753, 754 (1985). Schnapper noted that the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866
contained race-conscious provisions and "provided special aid and protection for
blacks . I..." Id , at 772-73. A July 1866 Congressional measure appropriated funds for
"the relief of destitute colored women and children." Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat.
310, 317. In March 1867, Congress appropriated funds "for the relief of freedmen or
destitute colored people of the District of Columbia, the same to be expended under the
direction of the commissioner of the bureau of freedmen and refugees." S. Res. 4, 40th
Cong., 15 Stat. 20 (1867). In addition, responding to fraudulent conduct by claims agents
in obtaining bounties and payments owed to southern black soldiers, Congress passed a
law requiring that the claims be paid to the commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, with
the commissioner supervising and then paying the claimants and their agents. See S. Res.
25, 40th Cong., 15 Stat. 26 (1867); Rubenfeld, supra, at 431-32.
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Justice Scalia, writing that "under our Constitution there can be no
such thing as either a creditor or debtor race," argued that to
pursue the concept of racial entitlement - even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and preserve
for future mischief the ways of thinking that produced race
slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American.97
Justice Thomas argued that "laws designed to subjugate a race
and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to
foster some current notion of equality" are morally and
constitutionally equivalent.9" "Government cannot make us equal; it
can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law."'
Thomas further declared that the "'benign' discrimination" of
These race-conscious legislative acts must be reckoned with by those who argue
that affirmative action violates the Equal Protection Clause. In the view of one scholar
these Reconstruction-era statutes prove that "those who profess fealty to the 'original
understanding,' who abhor judicial 'activism,' or who hold that the legal practices at the
time of the enactment 'say what they say' and dictate future interpretation, cannot
categorically condemn color-based distribution of governmental benefits as they do."
Rubenfeld, supra, at 431-32 (footnote omitted).
97. 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In
a 1979 law review commentary then-Professor Scalia discussed the notion of creditor and
debtor races. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 152-53.
His position on affirmative action was clearly and strongly stated: "I owe no man anything,
nor he me, because of the blood that flows in our veins." Id. at 153.
98. 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See also id. at 241 ("government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice").
Disagreeing with Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens argued that "[t]here is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system
and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination." Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Invidious discrimination oppresses and subjugates disfavored groups, he opined, while
race-based remedial measures seek to foster social equality. See id. See also id. at 245
("The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference between a 'No
Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.").
Readers interested in this debate are directed to Stanley Fish's critique of "the
idea that any action taken on the basis of a racial classification is equivalent to any other
action taken on the basis of racial classification." STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH
PRINCIPLE 42 (1999). On that view, "you can find quotas designed to exclude races from
institutions of higher education no different from admissions procedures that take race
into account as one of many factors .... Id. at 42-43. Fish argues against "a forced
inability to make distinctions that would be perfectly clear to any well-informed teenager-
distinctions between lynchings and set-asides, between a Shakespeare sonnet and hard-
core pornography, between (in Justice Stevens' words) a welcome mat and a no-entry
sign." Id. at 43.
99. 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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affirmative action "teaches many that because of chronic and
apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with
them without patronizing indulgence." ' Such programs are harmful,
in his view, because they "engender attitudes of superiority,"
"provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government's use of race," and "stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop tendencies
or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences.....
C. Hopwood
Emboldened and invigorated by Croson and Adarand,
individuals continued their assault on affirmative action measures."
In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood applied to the University of Texas Law
School. Her admissions file contained no letters of recommendation
or personal statement, and "her responses to the [application]
questions [were] brief and d[id] not elaborate on her background and
skill." 3 Denied admission, Hopwood brought suit alleging that the
law school's consideration of race in its admissions program
discriminated against whites and non-preferred minorities."' Three
100. Id. at 241.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
university scholarship program for African- American students unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of race).
103. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 564 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd and remanded in
part and appeal dismissed in part, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
104. Under the admissions program in effect in 1992, applications and supporting
materials were placed in color-coded files based on residency and race or ethnicity.
Pursuant to a presumptive admissions line set by the chair of the admissions committee,
applicants with a high Texas Index (TI) score (a composite number reflecting the
applicant's grade point average and LSAT score) were admitted. Applicants with TIs
below another line set by the chair were presumptively denied admission. Those with a TI
falling between the presumptive admit and the presumptive deny lines were placed in a
discretionary category, along with applications with scores above the presumptive admit
line which were questionable for other reasons, and applicants with presumptive deny
scores which were pulled up into the discretionary category after review by admissions
committee members. The discretionary category files of nonminority applicants were
divided into stacks of thirty and each file was reviewed by a three-member subcommittee
of the admissions committee. Applicants receiving two or three votes were offered
admission, applicants receiving no votes were denied admission, and applicants receiving
one vote were placed on a waiting list. See 861 F. Supp. at 560-62.
The applications of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans were reviewed
by a three-member minority subcommittee, with the subcommittee reviewing each file as a
group. That subcommittee then provided the full admissions committee with a summary
of minority files and identified minority candidates who should be considered for
admission, with "the minority subcommittee's admissions decisions on individual
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other unsuccessful applicants also sued. When one of them, Kenneth
Elliott, was denied admission, his father wrote a letter to the law
school dean stating that Elliot's "friends and family all feel that he
was not accepted to U.T. because of limited openings at U.T. due to
mandatory minority and women quotas which use a large percentage
of the openings."'0 5 After receiving the letter, the law school placed
Elliot on the waiting list and later admitted him (although he
contended that he did not receive notice of admission). 6
In Hopwood v. Texas 7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is
not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment" and
prohibited the use or consideration of race as a factor in admissions
decisions.9' While the use of race was proscribed, the court stated,
universities could lawfully consider other factors in deciding who
would be admitted to an incoming class:
A university may properly favor one applicant over another
because of his ability to play cello, make a downfield tackle, or
understand chaos theory. An admissions program may also
consider an applicant's home state or relationship to school
alumni. Law schools specifically may look at things such as
unusual or substantial extracurricular activities in college, which
may be atypical factors affecting undergraduate grades. Schools
may even consider factors such as whether an applicant's
parents attended college or the applicant's economic and social
background.'0 9
What a university may not do, the court held, is "use ... race to
achieve a diverse student body ... ""°
applicants ... virtually final." Id. at 563 (footnote omitted). Separate waiting lists, divided
by race and residence, were maintained by the law school. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996).
The law school discontinued this admissions process in 1995. 861 F. Supp. at 582
n.87.
105. Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
106. Id at 565-66.
107. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). For an excellent discussion and critique of this
decision, see Victor V. Wright, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Engages in
Suspect Compelling Interest Analysis in Striking Down an Affirmative Action Program, 34
Hous. L. REV. 871 (1997).
108. 78 F.3d at 944.
109. Id. at 946 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 948.
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In explaining its decision, the court noted the Supreme Court's
decisions in Croson and Adarand and reasoned that, in light of those
cases, it was not bound by Bakke:
[T]here has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other
than Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's
interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for
governmental race-based discrimination. Subsequent Supreme
Court caselaw strongly suggests, in fact, that it is not."'
On this view of the caselaw, the court determined that "the use
of ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part
of the consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional. Were
we to decide otherwise, we would contravene precedent that we are
not authorized to challenge.'.. 2 But, as Judge Wiener argued in his
concurrence, "if Bakke is to be declared dead, the Supreme Court,
not a three-judge panel of a circuit court, should make that
pronouncement..... Judge Wiener is surely correct; noting that lower
courts are to apply existing authority and not predict what it will do,
the Supreme Court has instructed that "[i]f a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case... the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions."...4 Not agreeing with Judge Wiener's
view and leading where the Supreme Court had not yet gone, the
prognosticating Fifth Circuit forged ahead and struck down the law
school's program. " '
111. ld at 945.
112. Id. at 945-46.
113. Id. at 963 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). Judge Wiener did not:
read the applicable Supreme Court precedent as having held squarely and
unequivocally either that remedying the effects of past discrimination is the only
compelling state interest that can ever justify racial classification, or conversely
that achieving diversity in the student body of a public graduate or professional
school can never be a compelling governmental interest ....
Id. at 964. He thus "perceive[d] no 'compelling' reason to rush in where the Supreme
Court fears-or at least declines-to tread." Id. at 965.
114. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989). See also Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 365 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e are
timid about declaring decisions by the Supreme Court overruled when the Court has not
said so"). On prediction theory and lower court decisions, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 226-28 (1990).
115. 78 F.3d 945-46. See also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d
1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that university's freshman admissions policy awarding
diversity bonus to nonwhite applicants was not narrowly tailored to achieve diverse
student body and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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While the Fifth Circuit invalidated the law school's already
discontinued admissions program, it is too often overlooked that the
plaintiffs' argument - that they were the victims of racegoating - was
ultimately rejected by the district court on remand after a four-day
bench trial."6  In 2000, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district
court. "'7 Reviewing the record de novo, the appeals court concluded
that the application files of each of the four plaintiffs "includes at
least one significant weakness.""... Hopwood "received her
undergraduate degree from a relatively weak institution, had
garnered at least 60 hours at a community college," and her "file
contained no letters of recommendation or personal statements.""'9
Douglas Carvell's LSAT score was in the 76' percentile, his grade
point average was below the median of applicants admitted in 1992,
and one of his undergraduate professors wrote that "he was
'disappointed' in Carvell's grades and that Carvell had a 'mediocre'
and 'uneven' academic performance. ''2° David Rogers had been
dismissed from the University of Texas undergraduate honors
program, graduated from what the law school deemed to be a
relatively weak institution, and provided no letters of
recommendation.' 2' Interestingly, Rogers noted on his application
that "as a white who attended an all-minority school for several years,
and who was raised by a single mother, I have an unusual
understanding of the challenges faced by women and minorities.""
And Elliott (whose father contended that his son was not admitted
because of quotas for minorities and women) 123 had a 2.98 grade point
average, wrote in his personal statement that he was "an average
student, studying when I needed to, partying more than I should, and
not managing my time efficiently," and "candidly admitted that his
undergraduate academic performance 'is not of the caliber expected
by the University of Texas School of Law.""24 Based on its review of
the record, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's finding
116. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998), affd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
117. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
118. Id. at 271.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 272.
122. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 567 (citation omitted).
123. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
124. 236 F.3d at 272 (footnote omitted).
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that the plaintiffs would not have been admitted under a race-blind
admissions program "was not merely free of reversible error but was
eminently correct."'25 Thus, their racegoating did not succeed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a
subsequent decision, disagreed with the result in, and reasoning of,
Hopwood. In Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 6
unsuccessful white applicants filed suit alleging that discrimination
against whites and others on the basis of race resulted in the denial of
their admission to the law school. The school considered race as one
criterion under the pertinent admissions procedures in order to enroll
a diverse student body. Divining the meaning of the several opinions
and views expressed by the justices in Bakke,'27 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that a majority of the Bakke Court "would have allowed
for some race-based considerations in educational institutions. Thus,
a race-based possibility must be taken to be the actual rationale
adopted by the Court."'28 Adarand and Croson did not call for a
different outcome. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court "has not
looked upon race-based factors with much favor,"'29 Smith noted that
the Court had
not returned to the area of university admissions, and has not
indicated that Justice Powell's approach has lost its vitality in
that unique niche of our society. As we see it, regardless of
what we think the Supreme Court might do, we must let it
decide whether the Bakke rationale... has become
moribund .... 130
Accordingly, the court concluded that "it ineluctably follows that
the Fourteenth Amendment permits University admissions programs
125. Id. (footnote omitted).
126. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
127. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text. In deciding the operational holding
of Bakke the Ninth Circuit applied Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). See Smith,
233 F.3d at 1199. For a discussion of Marks, see infra note 145 and accompanying text.
128. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199. The court reasoned:
[If the various opinions in Bakke mixed so many different colors that the result
became rather muddy, that result was still clear enough to permit educators to
rely upon the [Brennan] opinion that gave the decision its life and meaning - the
opinion that avoided both polar possibilities. More importantly, we are required
so to do.
Id. at 1200.




which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and
educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets
the demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures."3 ' Smith
thus provided an analytical counterpoint to, and created a circuit
conflict with, Hopwood.
IV. THE COURT'S 2003 MICHIGAN DECISIONS
Opponents of affirmative action had to be overjoyed with the
anti-affirmative-action trend found in Croson, Adarand, and
Hopwood and with what appeared to be the upper hand and superior
position in the battle over the issue of the legality of the consideration
of race by governmental entities. Twenty five years after Bakke the
Supreme Court returned to the question of the constitutionality of
affirmative action in higher education in two cases involving
admissions at the University of Michigan.
A. Grutter
At issue in Grutter v. Bollinger"' was the constitutionality of the
University of Michigan Law School's use of race as a factor in student
admission decisions. Individual applicants to that institution were
evaluated on the basis of information contained in their admissions
file, including grade point average, LSAT score, a personal statement,
letters of recommendation, and an essay setting forth applicants' view
of the contributions they would make to the law school's life and
diversity. The school's admissions policy provided that "no applicant
should be admitted unless we expect that applicant to do well enough
to graduate with no serious academic problems.. .""' The policy also
required admissions officers to consider "soft variables," such as "the
enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate
institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, and the areas and
difficulty of undergraduate course selection.. . "' Identifying
"diversity" as an aspiration but not defining it "solely in terms of
racial and ethnic status, ' '0 35 the policy expressed the law school's
"commitment to 'one particular type of diversity,' that is, 'racial and
131. Id. at 1200-01. Notwithstanding Smith, the law school's consideration of race was
prohibited by Washington voters' passage of Initiative Measure 200. See infra note 245
and accompanying text.
132. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students
from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native-Americans, who without
this commitment might not be represented in our student body in
meaningful numbers."' 36 According to the policy, the enrollment of a
"critical mass" of minority students would "'ensur[e] their ability to




Barbara Grutter, a white resident of the state of Michigan,
applied to the law school in 1996.138 When her application was
rejected, Grutter sued, alleging that she had been discriminated
against on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI),139 and
42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (Section 1981). 14' Grutter asserted that her
application was rejected because race was a predominant factor in the
admissions process, that certain minority group applicants had "a
significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar
credentials from disfavored racial groups, ''... and that there was no
compelling interest justifying the use of race in the admissions
process.142
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the law school's
admissions program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 3
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting law school policy).
138. See 123 S. Ct. at 2332. For information on Grutter's background and efforts to
attend the law school, see June Kronholz, Does a White Mom Add Diversity?, WALL ST.
J., June 25, 2003, at B3.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
140. That section provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts ... and to the full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
141. In testimony before the trial court Grutter's expert witness stated that being a
member of certain minority groups was "an extremely strong factor in the decision for
acceptance for admission" but conceded that race was not a predominant factor in the law
school's admissions consideration. 123 S. Ct. at 2334. The law school's expert concluded
that only 10% of the 35% of admitted underrepresented minority applicants would have
been admitted in 2000 if race were not considered. "Under this scenario,
underrepresented minority students would have comprised 4 percent of the entering class
in 2000 instead of the actual figure of 14.5 percent." Id. (citation omitted).
142. See id.




Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) noted that in the aftermath of Bakke
"courts have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell's diversity
rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no other Justice, is
nonetheless binding precedent" " under Marks v. United States.'5
Finding it unnecessary to decide whether Powell's opinion was
binding under Marks, O'Connor "endorse[d] Justice Powell's view
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions."'' 6
Applying strict scrutiny in the higher education context,' 7 Justice
O'Connor rejected the contention that the Court's post-Bakke
affirmative-action decisions' 8 foreclosed the law school's argument
that it had a compelling state interest in the diversity of its student
body:
It is true that some language in those opinions might be read to
suggest that remedying past discrimination is the only
permissible justification for race-based governmental
action .... But we have never held that the only governmental
144. Id. at 2337.
145. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). In Marks the Court stated that "[wlhen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." Id. at 193 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000),
discussed supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text, the court applied the Marks analysis
to the Bakke opinions of Justice Powell and Justice Brennan and concluded that "Powell's
analysis is the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious decision making process
could stand." 233 F.3d at 1200. Disagreeing with that view in its 2000 Hopwood decision,
the Fifth Circuit
[did] not read Marks as an invitation from the Supreme Court to read its
fragmented opinions like tea leaves, attempting to divine what the Justices
"would have" held. Rather, in the absence of subsequent Supreme Court
precedent squarely and unequivocally holding that diversity can never be a
compelling state interest, we read Bakke as not foreclosing (but certainly not
requiring) the acceptance by lower courts of diversity as a compelling state
interest.
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000).
146. 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
147. "Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the
Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 2338 (citation omitted). "Not every decision influenced
by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." Id.
148. See supra Parts III-A and III-B.
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use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past
discrimination. Nor, since Bakke, have we directly addressed
the use of race in the context of public higher education.
Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.149
That the law school deemed diversity as essential to its mission
was a judgment lying "primarily within the expertise of the
university" to which the Court deferred. 5 ' "[U]niversities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition" and enjoy educational
autonomy grounded in the First Amendment, and the interest in
diversity "is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional
mission, and.., good faith on the part of a university is presumed
absent a showing to the contrary.'' 1.. In furtherance of its efforts to
admit a diverse student body the law school sought to promote
"cross-racial understanding" and to enroll a "critical mass" of
minority students "defined by reference to the educational benefits
that diversity is designed to produce."'52  The policy, Justice
O'Connor continued,
promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons
of different races .... These benefits are important and
laudable, because classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited,
and simply more enlightening and interesting when the students
have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.5 3
149. See 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 2339.
151. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Dissenting on this point,
Justice Thomas argued that the First Amendment did not allow a public university to
engage in conduct violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2357 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 2339. Criticizing this part of the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia argued that
the educational benefit the law school sought
is not, of course, an "educational benefit" on which students will be graded on
their Law School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by
the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial
understanding). For it is a lesson in life rather than law-essentially the same
lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual
sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-grown
adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy
Scouts to public-school kindergartens.
Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 2340 (citations omitted). See also id. at 2341 (the law school's need for a
critical mass of minority students was not premised on the belief that there was a minority
viewpoint on an issue; "diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of
[Vol. 30:4
"These benefits are substantial" and real, Justice O'Connor
determined, a conclusion she supported by references to academic
studies and pro-diversity amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Court
by General Motors Corporation, 3M Company, military leaders, and
the Solicitor General of the United States.'54 Because education is
critical to the preparation of students for work and citizenship, "the
diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of
higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of
race or ethnicity. '  Universities and law schools are "the training
ground[s] for a large number of our Nation's leaders," O'Connor
continued, including governors, members of the United States Senate
and House of Representatives, and federal judges. 56
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy, in the
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the
educational institutions that provide this training .... Access to
legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive
of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity,
so that all members of society may participate in the
educational institutions that provide the training and education
necessary to succeed in America. "
Having concluded that diversity can be a compelling
governmental interest, Justice O'Connor turned to the next part of
the strict scrutiny analysis, asking and answering in the affirmative the
question whether the law school's admissions policy was narrowly
tailored. Likening the policy to the Harvard plan described in Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion, she noted that between 1993 and 2000 the
number of minority students in the law school's incoming classes
ranged from 13.5 percent to 20.1 percent; for the Justice, these
numbers indicated that the admissions program did not operate as a
quota and constitutionally considered race as a plus factor while
insuring that every candidate competed with all qualified applicants."
the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token members of
minority students").
154. See id. at 2339.
155. Id. at 2340.
156. Id. at 2341.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 2343. A dissenting Justice Kennedy argued that, from 1995 to 1998, the
Summer 20031 Race~toatinp Dynamics
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
She acknowledged that there is "some relationship between numbers
and achieving the benefits to be derived from diversity, and between
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students
admitted."'59 But that "attention to numbers, without more, does not
transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota."'60
Nor did the admissions policy make race or ethnicity the defining
aspect of an individual's application. The file of each applicant of any
race was subjected to a "highly individualized, holistic review"
considering all of the ways in which an applicant could contribute to
diversity, and no "mechanical, predetermined diversity 'bonuses'
based on race or ethnicity" were awarded.' All factors contributing
to diversity were considered by the law school,'62 each applicant was
given the opportunity to inform the institution of the ways in which
his or her admission would contribute to diversity, and nonminorities
were accepted who had grades and test scores lower than those of
underrepresented minorities who were rejected.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor opined, the existence of race-
neutral alternatives to achieve diversity did not mean that the
program was not narrowly tailored. "Narrow tailoring does not
require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor
does it require a university to choose between maintaining a
reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups."'6 3 What is
required is "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
seeks."'" Reasoning that the pursuit of a diverse student body via the
individual assessment of applicants would be precluded by a lottery,
the lowering of admissions standards for all students, or a percentage
plan,"'65 O'Connor was satisfied that the law school had sufficiently
"percentage of enrolled minorities fluctuated by only 0.3% from 13.5% to 13.8%." Id. at
2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "The narrow fluctuation band raises an inference that the
Law School subverted individual determination, and strict scrutiny requires the Law
School to overcome the inference." Id. at 2372.
159. Id. at 2343 (citation omitted) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
160. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
161. Id.
162. Diversity admittees "lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several
languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have exceptional
records of extensive community service, and have had successful careers in other fields."
Id. at 2344.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 2345 (citations omitted).
165. The law school sought a student body "diverse in ways broader than race." Id.
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considered alternatives "currently capable of producing a critical
mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic
selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission." '166
Finally, Justice O'Connor determined that the law school's
admissions program did not unduly burden persons who were not
members of the favored racial and ethnic groups. "Because the Law
School considers all pertinent elements of diversity, it can (and does)
select nonminority applicants who have greater potential to enhance
student body diversity over underrepresented minority applicants."16 '
This did not mean that race-conscious affirmative action has no
temporal limitations. As "all governmental use of race must have a
logical end point,"'68 O'Connor instructed that this "durational
requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious
admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity."'69
Accepting the law school's statement that it would end its
consideration of race in admissions "as soon as practicable,"'' ° she
opined:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use
of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the
Justice O'Connor stated:
Because a lottery would make that kind of nuanced judgment impossible, it
would effectively sacrifice all other educational values, not to mention every
other kind of diversity. So too the suggestion that the Law School simply lower
admissions standards for all students, a drastic remedy that would require the
Law School to become a much different institution and sacrifice a vital
component of its educational mission. The United States advocates "percentage
plans," recently adopted by public undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida,
and California to guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank
threshold in every high school in the State. . .. The United States does not,
however, explain how such plans could work for graduate and professional
schools ....
Id. (citation omitted). On percentage plans, see infra notes 265-89 and accompanying text.
166. 123 S. Ct. at 2345
167. Id. (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 2346. In a concurring opinion Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer,
argued that this observation "accords with the international understanding of the office of
affirmative action." See id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referring to and discussing
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
Affirmative action and the International Convention are discussed in Jordan J. Paust,
Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 330 (1999); Jordan J. Paust, The Permissibility of Affirmative Action
in Higher Education Under Human Rights Law, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 91 (1998).
169. 123 S. Ct. at 2346.
170. Id.
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context of public higher education. Since that time, the number
of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has
indeed increased .... We expect that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today. '71
While the dissenting opinions in Grutter made a number of
arguments in support of the view that the law school's admissions
policy was unconstitutional, of particular relevance to this enterprise
is the too-many-minorities and racegoating dynamics of their anti-
affirmative-action position. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by
Justice Thomas, provided a roadmap for the next generation of legal
challenges to affirmative action. These challenges will focus on the
following questions: (1) whether applicants were sufficiently
evaluated as individuals and were not placed on separate admissions
tracks, (2) whether a university "has so zealously pursued its 'critical
mass' as to make it an unconstitutional de facto quota system," (3)
"whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educational benefits
flow from racial diversity," (4) whether an institution's commitment
to diversity is bona fide, (5) whether "the institution's racial
preferences have gone below or above the mysterious Grutter-
approved 'critical mass,"' and (6) whether the rights of "minority
groups intentionally short changed in the institution's composition of
its generic minority 'critical mass"' have been violated.'72 More than a
roadmap, Scalia's questions provide an unmistakable signal that the
too-many-minorities and racegoating concerns of affirmative action
opponents live on post-Grutter, and that while an important battle
may have been lost, the war has now entered a new phase.
Justice Thomas opened his separate opinion'73 with a partial
171. Id. at 2346-47 (citation omitted). See also id. at 2348 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next
generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity
will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.").
Justice Thomas viewed Justice O'Connor's expectation that race-based
affirmative action will not be needed in twenty-five years as a "holding that racial
discrimination will be illegal in 25 years." Id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2364
(same). No such holding can be derived from a fair reading of Justice O'Connor's
opinion. Indeed, and interestingly, Thomas joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
which the Chief Justice stated that the Court "suggests a possible 25-year limitation on the
Law School's current program." Id. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Rehnquist did not refer to Justice O'Connor's expectation as a holding of the
Court.
172. Id. at 2349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. For a discussion of Justice Thomas's opinion and views on affirmative action, see
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quotation from a January 1865 speech by Frederick Douglass."4 The
following quotation is set forth in the Justice's opinion, with passages
of Douglass' speech not quoted by Thomas contained in brackets:
[I think the American people are disposed often to be generous
rather than just. I look over this country at the present time,
and I see Educational Societies, Sanitary Commissions,
Freedmen's Association, and the like-all very good; but] in
regard to the colored people, there is always more that is
benevolent, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The
American people have always been anxious to know what they
shall do with us. [Gen. Banks was distressed with solicitude as
to what he should do with the negro. Everybody has asked the
question, and they learned to ask it early of the abolitionists:
"What shall we do with the negro?"] I have had but one answer
from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us
has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If
the apples will not remain on the tree of their own strength, if
they are worm-eaten at the core, if they are early ripe and
disposed to fall, let them fall! [I am not for tying or fastening
them on the tree in any way, except by nature's plan, and if they
will not stay there let them fall.] And if the negro cannot stand
on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance
to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! [If you see him on his
way to school, let him alone,-don't disturb him! If you see him
going to the dinner table at a hotel, let him go! If you see him
going to the ballot box, let him alone!-don't disturb him! If you
see him going into a workshop, just let him alone,-] your
interference is doing him positive injury.7 1
Stanley Fish, One Man's Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at A23 (National Edition).
For an argument that the Thomas opinion "is a clinical study of a man who has been
driven barking mad by the beneficial treatment he has received," see Maureen Dowd,
Could Thomas Be Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A27 (National Edition).
174. This was not the first time that a Thomas opinion opened with a Douglass
quotation. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Interestingly, this resort to and invocation of Douglass, a towering figure in
American and African-American history, is made by a justice who reportedly said the
following to a young black man regarding Thomas's hiring of law clerks: "I look for the
maths and the sciences, real classes, none of that Afro-American studies stuff. If they've
taken that stuff as an undergraduate, I don't want them. You want to do that, do it in your
spare time." RON SUSKIND, A HOPE IN THE UNSEEN: AN AMERICAN ODYSSEY FROM
THE INNER CITY To THE IVY LEAGUE 121 (1998).
175. Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston,
Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865) in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (John W.
Blasingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991). In referring to General Nathaniel Banks,
Douglass was criticizing a contract-labor system established and enforced by the general in
Louisiana in which freed slaves were forced to work on plantations. See Gregory D.
Stanford, Thomas Shamelessly Hijacks Language of Cultural Icon, MILWAUKEE J. &
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The passages not quoted by Thomas are critical to an
understanding of the full meaning and import of Douglass's speech.
Douglass clearly states in an omitted phrase that the work of the
Educational Societies, Sanitary Commissions, and the Freedmen's
Association were "all very good.. .""' A reader of Justice Thomas's
opinion who was unaware of this language would not know that
Douglass had favorably mentioned those "religious, secular, and
quasi-governmental agencies created during the Civil War to meet
the spiritual, intellectual, and medical needs of both freedmen and
Union soldiers." '177 The phrase "Let him alone!" did not refer to and
was not concerned with those organizations and their efforts to assist
African-Americans and others. Rather, "Let him alone!" was
directed at those clearly identified in the Douglass speech but not
quoted by Thomas, at those who obstructed and accosted African-
Americans as they made their way to schools and to work or sought
to eat in hotels or cast their ballots in elections. The "positive injury"
to which Douglass referred is the injury caused by General Banks and
others who interfered with the rights, interests, and lives of African-
Americans.
Omitting key language from the quotation of the speech gives
the wrong impression that Douglass was philosophically opposed to a
contemporary concept of affirmative action. The real and intended
targets of his plea for freedom from racist interference were those
who would not give an African-American "a chance to stand on his
own legs!" '78 And we know from history that his plea fell on the deaf
ears of many, as evidenced by what occurred in this nation in and
after 1865 and the destructive racial discrimination in education,
employment, public accommodations, voting, and other areas which
is an undeniable fact and part of this nation's past and present. To
suggest, on the basis of selective quotation, that Douglass would
oppose affirmative action in university admissions today - when
"[t]he cruel legacy of 250 years of slavery has proved more stubborn
than even .. . Douglass, a former slave and consummate
realist,.. . imagined""7 9 - is nothing more than rhetoric and cannot
and should not be elevated to or confused with a definitive
SENTINEL, June 29, 2003, at 4J.
176. 4 FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 175, at 68.
177. Id. at 68 n.12 (editors' note).
178. Id. at 68.
179. Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 4 (2002).
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declaration by Douglass on the issue before the Court in Grutter.
Having invoked Douglass, Justice Thomas wrote, "Like
Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American
life without the meddling of university administrators.' 8 (Query
whether this resort to iconography adds anything of analytical
significance to the question before the Court.)'81 Expressing his belief
that the law school's consideration of race violated the Equal
Protection Clause, Thomas argued that the law school's interest in
"diversity" "is more a fashionable catchphrase than it is a useful term,
especially when something as serious as racial discrimination is at
issue."'82 The law school's interest was in aesthetics, he argued, in "a
certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its
classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them.'' 83
The Law School's argument, as facile as it is, can only be
understood in one way: Classroom aesthetics yields educational
benefits, racially discriminatory admissions policies are required
to achieve the right racial mix, and therefore the policies are
required to achieve the educational benefits. It is the
educational benefits that are the end, or allegedly compelling
state interest, not "diversity".....
180. 123 S. Ct. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
id. at 2365: "It has been nearly 140 years since Frederick Douglass asked the intellectual
ancestors of the Law School to '[d]o nothing with us!' and the Nation adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment."
181. I have written elsewhere about the dangers of the misappropriation of the words
and views of African-American icons by individuals opposed to affirmative action and
color-conscious interpretation and application of the Constitution. See Ronald Turner,
The Dangers of Misappropriation: Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Legacy to Prove the
Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101 (1996). This danger and criticism applies as
well to Justice Thomas's invocation of Frederick Douglass.
182. 123 S. Ct. at 2352 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2353 (citation omitted).
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Recognizing that true meritocracy is not "the order of the day at
the Nation's universities," '85 Justice Thomas turned his attention to
African-Americans, not to other groups eligible for affirmative action
consideration under the law school's policy. "[N]o modern law school
can claim ignorance of the poor performance of blacks, relatively
speaking, on the" LSAT, yet
law schools continue to use the test and then attempt to
"correct" for black underperformance by using racial
discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic
student body. The Law School's continued adherence to
measures it knows produce racially skewed results is not
entitled to deference by this Court. 86
Accusing the law school of not searching for students who will
succeed in law school but of seeking "only a facade,"'87 Thomas
opined that the law school "tantalizes unprepared students with the
promise of a University of Michigan degree and all the opportunities
that it offers. These overmatched students take the bait, only to find
that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.""'
Affirmative action in admissions is followed by preferential treatment
in selection for the law review, judicial clerkships, and jobs, Thomas
continued, and he saw no evidence that minority law graduates
"received a qualitatively better legal education (or become better
lawyers) than if they had gone to a less 'elite' law school for which
185. Thomas wrote:
[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other measures to
"predict" academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every
applicant a chance to prove that he can succeed in the study of law. The rallying
cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a
true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous
exceptions to "merit." For example.., much has been made of the fact that elite
institutions utilize a so-called "legacy" preference to give the children of alumni
an advantage in admissions. This, and other exceptions to "true" meritocracy
give the lie to protestations that merit admissions are in fact the order of the day
at the Nation's universities ....
Id. at 2359-60. However, Thomas noted, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
legacy preferences or other arbitrary admissions procedures. "So while legacy preferences
can stand under the Constitution, racial discrimination cannot." Id. at 2360 (footnote
omitted). For more on legacy admissions, see infra notes 290-97, and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 2360-61 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
187. "The Law School seeks only a facade-it is sufficient that the class looks right,
even if it does not perform right." Id. at 2362.
188. 123 S. Ct. at 2362.
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they were better prepared. And the aestheticists will never address
the real problems facing 'underrepresented minorities,' instead
continuing their social experiments on other people's children.""8 9
Justice Thomas then expressed his concern that others would not
be able to distinguish between the "handful of blacks who would be
admitted in the absence of racial discrimination" and those African-
Americans admitted through affirmative action. "Who can
differentiate between those who belong and those who do not? The
majority of blacks are admitted to the law school because of
discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as
undeserving."'" In his view, this stigma begets suspicion:
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government,
industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether
their skin color played a part in their advancement. The
question itself is the stigma - because either racial
discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be
deemed "otherwise unqualified," or it did not, in which case
asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who
would succeed without discrimination .... 191
Rather than avoid the stigma of affirmative action, Thomas
wrote, the Court placed its imprimatur on a practice that fails to
adhere to the equality principle of the Declaration of Independence
and the Equal Protection Clause and is contrary to the color-blind
Constitution of which (the race-conscious) Justice Harlan spoke of in
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.'92
189. Id. (footnote omitted).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Harlan's colorblindness is set out in his statement, "Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at
559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's race consciousness is revealed in another passage of
his dissenting opinion:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so
it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage
and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
Id. As noted by one scholar, "For Harlan. . . social and economic inequality was simply
part of the natural order of things, a result of the superiority of white civilization." Molly
Townes O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter's Color-
Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 761 (1998). See also Gabriel J. Chin,
The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 172 (1996)
(noting that while Harlan "believed the Fourteenth Amendment rendered African
Americans 'our equals before the law' . . . [ilt is not so clear that Harlan thought African
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The Thomas opinion presents several troubling views concerning
the presence of African-American students at the Michigan law
school (and, by extension, on the campuses of this nation's colleges
and universities, "elite" or otherwise). He asserts that law students at
the University of Michigan are unprepared and overmatched and
cannot succeed, and that their life in and after law school is and will
be one big affirmative action party in which doors will be thrown
open for them. In Justice Thomas's view, most African-Americans at
the law school are there, not because they are intelligent and
hardworking and qualified students and future lawyers and members
of the bar, but because they are the black subjects of social
experimentation who were admitted by an institution interested not
in them, but in racial aesthetics and the facade of diversity. On that
view, the law school was not just arguably misguided or acting
pursuant to what Justice Thomas believed to be a flawed
interpretation of the Constitution; rather, the school knowingly put in
place and was perpetuating an academic fraud, a facade, with no
interest in, or concern for, students of color.
Such denigration of those with a different view of the law and the
educational mission of the institution is troubling, especially when
coming from a justice who decries the lack of civility in law and
society.93  It is all the more troubling given the findings and
conclusion of a study (noted and discussed in several amici briefs
submitted to the Court)194 that African-American and other minority
graduates of the Michigan law school have been as successful as their
white counterparts as measured by income, satisfaction, and service
contributions as a citizen/lawyer. '95
For Justice Thomas, those black folks admitted to the law school
ruined it for and (in an interesting choice of words) "tarred as
undeserving" the "handful of blacks" who did not have to rely on
discrimination in order to gain admission."6 So tarred, the presence
Americans were the moral equals of the majority race").
193. See William Raspberry, Justice on the High Ground, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1998, at
A21.
194. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan Black Law Alumni, Grutter v. Bollinger,
2003 WL 399060 (Feb. 14, 2003) (No. 02-241); Brief of Amici Curiae the Society of
American Law Teachers , Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003 WL 537217 (Feb. 19, 2003) (No. 02-
241).
195. See David L. Chambers, Richard 0. Lempert, and Terry K. Adams, Michigan's
Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 395 (2000).
196. 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of African-Americans "in the highest places"' 97 triggers questions
about their competence, questions posed by individuals who evidently
assume that they stand in a superior position and have the right to
judge all African-Americans and other people of color, and who
apparently see and reflexively react to phenotype (so much for
colorblindness). This account of the posited stigma of affirmative
action, if true, means that "it is an open question today whether [the]
skin color" of Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security
Adviser Condoleeza Rice, Representative Harold Ford of Tennessee
(a 1996 Michigan law graduate), '98 American Express chief executive
officer Kenneth Chenault, Harvard University professor William
Julius Wilson, and other African-Americans in "high places" "played
a part in their advancement"'9 9 and stigmatizes them."0 In my view,
such a question ignores the demonstrated abilities and
accomplishments of these and other individuals of color2"' and
warrants strict scrutiny of the inquisitor and not the subjects of the
query.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's separate dissent, joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, argued that the law school's
admissions policy was a "sham" and "a naked effort to achieve racial
balancing," that minorities who were less qualified than Barbara
Grutter were admitted, and that not considering race would have
resulted in the admission of a significantly smaller number of
underrepresented minorities.0 2 In other words, too many minorities
197. Id. Whether African-Americans in "lower" places experience the same
interrogation of their competence is not discussed by the Justice.
198. See James W. Brosnan, Ford Optimistic on Court-Ruling-Program Helped
Congressman, COM. APPEAL (TN.), Apr. 2, 2003, at A2.
199. 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Given his fear of stigma, is Justice Thomas on, or would he add himself to, that
list? The question whether Justice Thomas was himself the beneficiary of affirmative
action has been raised and answered in the affirmative by several commentators. See, e.g.,
Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 14 (2000); Kimberle Crenshaw, Playing Race Cards: Constructing a
Pro-Active Defense of Affirmative Action, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 196, 201 (1999-2000). But
see Jessica Alicia Brown, Brock's Word Against Hers, 5 YALE J. L. & FEMIN. 253,254 n.11
(1993) (author reports interview with then Yale Law School Dean Guido Calabresi in
which Calabresi objected to "the statement that Clarence Thomas was admitted through
affirmative action").
201. For a listing of "a phalanx of black lawyers" who have "relied on their brilliant
legal minds to win the battle for justice and economic parity in the courtroom and the
boardroom," see America's Top Black Lawyers, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 2003, at 121-
38.
202. 123 S. Ct. at 2365, 2367, 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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were admitted by the law school. Moreover, Rehnquist wrote, "from
1995 through 2000 the percentage of admitted applicants who were
members of... minority groups closely tracked the percentage of
individuals in the school's applicant pool who were from the same
group.12°3 Thus, he concluded, the law school's admissions policy was
"a carefully managed program designed to ensure proportionate
representation of applicants from selected minority groups. 2 4 Again,
the law school had too many minorities, and in Rehnquist's view their
presence was the reason that Grutter did not gain admission to the
University of Michigan Law School.
B. Gratz
Affirmative action in undergraduate admissions was at issue in
Gratz v. Bollinger."5 In 1995 and 1997, respectively, Jennifer Gratz
and Patrick Hamacher, white residents of the state of Michigan,
applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA). The procedure in place in
1995 evaluated applications according to a "GPA 2" score comprised
of grade point average and "SCUGA" factors.0 6 Counselors then
referred to tables listing GPA 2 ranges and the applicant's score on
the American College Test (ACT) or Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
and decided what action would be taken (admit, reject, delay for
more information, or postpone for reconsideration) with respect to
the applicant. Because these tables called for different decisions
based on the race or ethnicity of the applicant, Gratz's GPA 2 and
ACT score resulted in a postponed decision on her application (which
was subsequently rejected)."0 Minority applicants with similar scores,
however, would have been admitted. °  Modified in 1997, the
admissions procedure gave additional points for underrepresented
minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or underrepresentation
in the academic unit to which the applicant sought admission. Under
that procedure a decision on Hamacher's application was postponed
203. Id. at 2368.
204. Id. at 2369.
205. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
206. As described by the Court, the SCUGA factors "included the quality of an
applicant's high school (S), the strength of an applicant's high school curriculum (C), an
applicant's unusual circumstances (U), an applicant's geographical residence (G), and an
applicant's alumni relationships (A)." Id. at 2419.
207. Gratz enrolled at, and in 1999 graduated from, the University of Michigan at
Dearborn. See id. at 2417.
208. See id. at 2419.
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and his application was later denied.29  In turn, "[a]n
underrepresented minority applicant [with a similar
application].., would generally have been admitted.""2 '
In 1998, the university began to use a different admissions system
based on a selection index (see the Appendix to this article). A
maximum of 150 points was awarded to applicants on the basis of
high school grade point average, standardized test scores, high school
curriculum strength or weakness, Michigan residency, relationships
with alumni, an essay, and achievement or leadership. Twenty points
were awarded if an applicant was a member of an underrepresented
racial or ethnic minority group, attended a predominantly minority or
disadvantaged high school, or was a recruited athlete.21 ' Applicants
with 100-150 points were admitted; those with 95-99 points were
admitted or a final disposition as to their application was postponed;
scores of 90-94 resulted in postponements or admissions while those
in the 75-89 range were delayed or postponed; and the applications of
individuals receiving scores of 74 or below were delayed or rejected."2
In addition, the university reserved "protected seats" for "protected
categories" - athletes, foreign students, Reserved Officer Training
Corps candidates, and underrepresented minorities - and opened
those seats to all qualified candidates where seats were not filled near
the end of the admissions cycle. 13 Beginning in 1999 admissions
counselors were allowed to "flag" applications for review by an
Admissions Review Committee (ARC), with the ARC empowered
to decide to admit, defer, or deny admissions to flagged applicants.
The district court, ruling on the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment, held that the LSA's 1995-1998 admissions
program's protection of seats for underrepresented minorities
209. Hamacher enrolled at Michigan State University and graduated from that
institution. See id. at 2417.
210. Id. at 2419.
211. See id. at 2419; id. at 2431-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. See 123 S. Ct. at 2419.
213. See id. at 2420.
214. As described by the Court:
[C]ounselors may, in their discretion, "flag" an application for the ARC to
review after determining that the applicant (1) is academically prepared to
succeed at the University, (2) has achieved a minimum selection index score, and
(3) possesses a quality or characteristic important to the University's composition
of its freshman class, such as high class rank, unique life experiences, challenges,
circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, and
underrepresented race, ethnicity, or geography ..
Id. at 2420.
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unlawfully prevented non-protected applicants from competing for
the reserved slots and was the equivalent of a quota."5 That court
further held that the admissions program in place in 1999 and 2000
was narrowly tailored to achieve the educational benefits resulting
from a racially and ethnically diverse student body, as rigid quotas
were not utilized and the policy did not seek to admit a previously set
number of minority students. In addition, the court concluded that
the twenty points awarded to minority candidates did not insulate
those candidates from review and that the program did not seek to
achieve racial balancing.
Granting direct review of the district court's ruling,"6 the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that
the university's then-current admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored and was therefore unlawful."7 Writing for himself and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that while the use of race in admissions was
permitted by Grutter, the undergraduate policy's particular use of
race went too far. "[T]he University's policy, which automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee
admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant
solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest
in educational diversity" that the university claimed justified its
program. 8 Referring to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, Rehnquist
noted that Powell "did not contemplate that any single characteristic
automatically ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a
university's diversity... . Instead, under the approach Justice Powell
described, each characteristic of a particular applicant was to be
considered in assessing the applicant's entire application." ' 9
The admissions policy LSA began to use in 1998 did not provide
the requisite individual evaluation of each applicant, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, as the award of twenty points for minority status
215. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd in part
and remanded, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
216. Although the case had been argued to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, Gratz and Hamacher asked the Supreme Court "to grant
certiorari... despite the fact the Court of Appeals had not yet rendered a judgment" and
the Court granted that request. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2422.
217. The Court also held that Gratz and Hamacher had standing to seek injunctive and
declaratory relief, even though both had graduated from other universities. See id. This
holding drew the dissent of Justice Stevens. Id. at 2435-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 2427-28.
219. Id. at 2428 (citation omitted).
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"has the effect of making the factor of race decisive for virtually every
minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.5 220  To
illustrate this point he turned to an example contained in the Harvard
College admissions program discussed by Justice Powell in Bakke.
Three candidates were discussed therein: (1) "A, the child of a
successful black physician in an academic community with promise of
superior academic performance," (2) "B, a black who grew up in an
inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose achievement was
lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an
apparently abiding interest in black power," and (3) "C, a white
student with extraordinary artistic talent" whose "unique ability
might give him an edge over both A and B."'22 Under the Michigan
system all underrepresented minority applicants would receive twenty
points, Rehnquist noted, while student C would receive a maximum
of five points for his artistic talent, even if that talent "rivaled that of
Monet or Picasso.,
222
Clearly, the LSA's system does not offer applicants the
individualized application process described in Harvard's
example. Instead of considering how the differing backgrounds,
experiences, and characteristics of students A, B, and C might
benefit the University, admissions counselors reviewing LSA
applications would simply award both A and B 20 points
because their applications indicate they are African-American,
and student C would receive up to 5 points for his
"extraordinary talent. 2 23
The university's flagging system did not provide the necessary
individualized review, Rehnquist concluded. Referring again to the
Harvard program example, he reasoned that applicants with the
individual backgrounds and characteristics of applicants like student
A would never be considered because student A would always be
admitted and never flagged. While applicants B and C could be
flagged and individually considered, "[t]he record does not reveal
precisely how many applications are flagged for this individualized
220. Id. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis and footnote omitted).
221. Id. at 2428-29 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324).
222. Id. at 2429.
223. Id. (footnote omitted). Agreeing with the Court, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the undergraduate admissions policy "stands in sharp contrast to the law school's
admissions plan, which enables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments with
respect to the contributions each applicant is likely to make to the diversity of the
incoming class." Id. at 2432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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consideration, but it is undisputed that such consideration is the
exception and not the rule in the operation of the LSA's admissions
program."22 '  To satisfy strict scrutiny, applicants must receive
Grutter-type individualized consideration even where doing so can
"present administrative challenges" arising from the volume of
applications. 5  As the university's undergraduate admissions
program did not meet this standard, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the institution's use of race was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the compelling interest of diversity and therefore violated
the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, and Section 1981.226
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that
the undergraduate program "is closer to what Grutter approves than
to what Bakke condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on
the current record." '227 Unlike the admissions system struck down in
Bakke, the Michigan undergraduate program
lets all applicants compete for all places and values an
applicant's offering for any place not only on grounds of race,
but on grades, test scores, strength of high school, quality of
course of study, residence, alumni relationships, leadership,
personal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic ability,
and quality of a personal essay .... A nonminority applicant
who scores highly in these other categories can readily garner a
selection index exceeding that of a minority applicant who gets
the 20-point bonus ....
Justice Souter continued: "The college simply does by a
numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its 'holistic
review"' and the awarding of twenty points for minority status did not
make race a deciding factor comparable to the setting aside of seats
for minorities invalidated by Bakke.2 19  Finding no constitutional
problem with "the college's forthrightness in saying just what plus
224. Id. at 2429. Justice Souter would have remanded the case for the submission of
evidence concerning the actual work, functions, and determinations of the ARC. See id. at
2442 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2430.
226. See id. "[D]iscrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause ... committed
by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI," and
"purposeful discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause ... will also violate
Section 1981." Id. at 2430 n.23 (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 2439 (Souter, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2440 (citations omitted).
229. Id. at 2441.
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factor it gives for membership in an underrepresented minority, 23 he
preferred the candor of the LSA approach to the "deliberate
obfuscation" of the systems guaranteeing admissions to a set
percentage of top students from each high school used in California,
Florida, and Texas 3.2 ' Those percentage systems "are just as race
conscious as the point scheme (and fairly so), but they get their
racially diverse results without directly saying what they are doing or
why they are doing it .... Equal protection cannot become an
exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.,
232
In her separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted the current
effects and manifestations of the nation's history of racial
discrimination and argued that the Constitution is both colorblind
and color-conscious:
"To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a
classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a
burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the
Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color
conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to
undo the effects of past discrimination." ... Contemporary
human rights documents draw just this line; they distinguish
between policies of oppression and measures designed to
accelerate de facto equality.233
Viewed in this light, Ginsburg opined, the undergraduate
admissions program was not constitutionally infirm, as it did not
reserve seats on the basis of race, there was no suggestion that it was
adopted to limit or decrease the enrollment of any racial or ethnic
group, and there was no showing that the admissions prospects of
students who did not receive race-based consideration were unduly
constricted.
3 1
In an interesting passage, Justice Ginsburg explained why
"Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative
action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through
230. Id. at 2442.
231. Percentage plans are discussed infra at notes 265-89 and accompanying text.
232. 123 S. Ct. at 2442 (Souter, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 2444-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966) (opinion of Wisdom,
J.)).
234. See id. at 2445.
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winks, nods, and disguises.""23 She noted:
One can reasonably anticipate ... that colleges and universities
will seek to maintain their minority enrollment - and the
networks and opportunities thereby opened to minority
graduates - whether or not they can do so in full candor
through adoption of affirmative action plans of the kind at issue
here. Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher
education may resort to camouflage. For example, schools may
encourage applicants to write of their cultural tradition in the
essays they submit, or to indicate whether English is their
second language. Seeking to improve their chances for
admission, applicants may highlight the minority group
associations to which they belong, or the Hispanic surnames of
their mothers or grandparents. In turn, teachers'
recommendations may emphasize who a student is as much as
what he or she has accomplished ....
Grutter has settled the important question of whether race-based
diversity can be considered in deciding who will be admitted to the
nation's institutions of higher education. Those who have been
concerned about too many minorities and who have claimed that they
were victims who were unlawfully denied and deprived of admissions
that went to people of color can no longer validly assert that an
institution's consideration of and desire for racial diversity, standing
alone, is an unconstitutional act. Exactly how institutions can
consider race was also settled, as a general matter, by Grutter and
Gratz. Holistic review of individual applicants is permissible; an
automatic awarding of specific points for membership in a particular
racial group is not. Whether and how these general propositions will
stand up to specific applications of Grutter and to the devil-in-the-
details aspects of affirmative action as institutions promulgate and
implement post-Grutter programs remains to be seen.
235. Id. at 2446 (footnote omitted).
236. Id. (citations omitted). Concluding that Justice Ginsburg's views on the ways in
which colleges and universities would continue to enroll minorities were "remarkable,"
the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote that Ginsburg's observations "suggest that
universities ... will pursue their affirmative-action programs whether or not they violate
the United States Constitution," and that such violations "should be dealt with, not by
requiring the universities to obey the Constitution, but by changing the Constitution so
that it conforms to the conduct of the universities." Id. at 2430 n.22.
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V. THE NEXT PHASE
While the legal debate over the question whether race can be
considered in college and university admissions has been decided, the
next battles over the BakkelGrutter legal regime have just begun.
Opponents of the use and consideration of race in college admissions
and other areas will not end their campaign against affirmative action.
The Supreme Court has spoken but much more remains to be said, as
the too-many-minorities and racegoating dynamics and concerns
animating those who oppose affirmative action still exist. Unable to
convince the Court of the rightness of their position on race and the
Constitution, the focus now shifts to reaction, reassessment, and
resistance.
Recall, in this regard, Justice Scalia's catalogue of and roadmap
for the next generation of post-Grutter issues.237 Those who continue
to hold the anti-affirmative-action position can surely take solace in
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion and will undoubtedly monitor the
subjects he identified. Terence Pell, president of the Center for
Individual Rights (CIR) (the organization that sponsored the Grutter
and Gratz litigation) has let it be known that CIR will sue colleges
and universities that improperly consider race, and that Grutter
"increases considerably the odds that there's going to be additional
litigation here." '238 "If the first 24 hours [after the Court's decision in
Grutter] are any indication," Pell has stated, "I think some schools are
determined to continue to take race into account, and it's business as
usual for them. 2 39  When the President of Rice University
commented in August 2003 that his institution would consider race as
a criterion in admissions, the Center for Equal Opportunity (CEO)
submitted a letter of complaint to the United States Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights. In that letter the CEO stated,
"For [Rice] to use racial and ethnic preferences in spite of a lack of
any need to do so violates" the law, and the organization requested
that Rice be required "to re-embrace a non-preferential approach.,
2
11
Acting in the face of threatened litigation, institutions have
237. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
238. Diana Jean Schemo, Group Vows to Monitor Academia's Responses, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2003, at A23; see also Affirmative Action: Moving on, but very slowly, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 4-10, 2003, at 30 (noting that Center for Individual Rights "is compiling
a list of wrongs to use in suits against other universities. Lawyers will be busy for years.").
239. Schemo, supra note 238, at A23 (bracketed material added).
240. Todd Ackerman, Rice Under Fire on Racial Preference, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 19,
2003, at 15A.
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begun to promulgate and implement post-Grutter admissions policies
that consider race. For instance, the University of Michigan has
announced that it will continue to consider race in undergraduate
admissions, but will not award extra points to minority applicants and
will no longer give points for alumni connections, extracurricular
activities, and the like.24' Moving to a system of holistic review of
application files, Michigan will hire over twenty application
counselors and readers under a new system that will increase the costs
of its admissions process by $1.5 to $2 million.242 Likewise, the Board
of Regents of the University of Texas system has decided that race
may be considered in admissions decisions and has called on all
components of the system to submit for approval any plans for the
use of race.243
In the wake of Grutter, it can also be anticipated that the anti-
affirmative-action movement will increasingly turn to state initiatives
like those already in place in California 2" and Washington 245 which
prohibit public institutions from considering race in public
employment, education, or contracting. Indeed, in the weeks
following the Court's decisions in the Michigan cases, anti-
affirmative-action advocates in Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, and
Utah began to consider plans for referenda and initiatives barring
race-conscious affirmative action."6 Participating in that planning is
241. See Greg Winter, U. of Michigan Alters Policy On Using Race in Admissions, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at All (National Edition).
242. See id.
243. See Press Release, Univ. of Texas, University's Admission Policy to Include
Consideration of Race (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.utexas. edu/opa/news/
03newsreleases/nr_200308/nr_admission030828.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). Although
the University of Texas hoped to implement the race-conscious policy for the fall semester
of 2004, implementation of the policy could be delayed until September 2005 as the result
of a state statute requiring the posting of changes in admissions policies one year in
advance of the change. See Press Release, Univ. of Texas, Statement on Reinstatement of
Affirmative Action in Admission (Sep. 10, 2003), available at http://www.utexas.edu/opa
/news/03newsreleases/nr_200309/nraffirmative0309l0.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
Texas A&M University has announced that race will not be considered as a factor in
admissions. See Todd Ackerman, Texas at Center of Debate Over Race, Admissions,
HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2003, at 43A.
244. See infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text.
245. In November 1998, voters in the state of Washington passed Initiative Measure
200. That measure provides, among other things, that "[t]he state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting." See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(1) (West
2002).
246. See Andrew Hacker, Saved?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2003, at 22; Steve
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Ward Connerly 247 ("who is himself black"),249 one of the architects of
Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative, which provides
that "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting.,
249
Proponents of Proposition 209 were not bashful in expressing
their concerns and reasons for that initiative. The state ballot
pamphlet published before the vote on the measure stated: "A
generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to prohibit
discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights
movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas,
preferences, and set-asides., 25" The proponents of the measure
further argued that:
[T]wo wrongs don't make a right! Today, students are being
rejected from public universities because of their RACE. Job
applicants are turned away because their RACE does not meet
some "goal" or "timetable." Contracts are awarded to high
bidders because they are of the preferred RACE. That's just
plain wrong and unjust. Government should not discriminate.
It must not give a job, a university admission, or a contract
based on race or sex. Government must judge people equally,
without discrimination!...
Miller, Connerly Expands Fight Against Race Preferences, WASH. TIMES, Jul. 10, 2003, at
A7.
247. See Miller, supra note 246. For discussion of Connerly's efforts to secure the
passage of Proposition 209, an anti-affirmative-action initiative in California, see WARD
CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: MY FIGHT AGAINST RACE PREFERENCES 168-202
(2000).
248. Patricia J. Williams, Send in the Clowns, NATION, Sep. 29, 2003, at 9. Noting that
Connerly's "name is almost invariably followed in news accounts by the phrase 'who is
himself black,"' Williams writes that "[tlhis is usually followed by a short quote from
Connerly proclaiming that he's not only black, but also white, French, Irish and Native
American." Id. This is "paradoxical: Connerly's blackness is almost always mentioned as
a kind of rhetorical nod to his 'authenticity' in proclaiming the stigma thereof .... " Id.
249. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a).
250. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting ballot pamphlet).
251. Id. at 697 (quoting pamphlet). Opponents of the proposition responded to these
arguments:
California law currently allows tutoring, mentoring, outreach, recruitment, and
counseling to help ensure equal opportunity for women and minorities.
Proposition 209 will eliminate affirmative action programs like these that help
achieve equal opportunity for women and minorities in public employment,
education and contracting. Instead of reforming affirmative action to make it
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In 1996, fifty-four percent of California voters who cast ballots
voted for Proposition 209 and made that initiative part of the state
constitution.252
To the extent that state initiatives like Proposition 209 and
Washington's Initiative 200253 stand up to constitutional challenges,'
proponents of affirmative action will see further trouble on the legal
horizon. For instance, after the vote on Proposition 209 a number of
groups and individuals filed a lawsuit contending that the proposition
denied racial minorities and women the equal protection of the laws
and, because it conflicted with Title VII and other federal statutes,
was void under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.255 In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson... the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying what it
called "conventional" equal protection analysis, concluded that
"there is simply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional. '' 7
The Ninth Circuit stated:
fair for everyone, Proposition 209 makes the current problem worse ....
Id. (quoting ballot pamphlet).
252. See id.; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a).
253. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
254. Discussing the constitutionality of Proposition 209, one scholar posited:
The Constitution permits affirmative action because affirmative action does not
force a second-class status or citizenship on anyone. But abolishing affirmative
action does not thrust a second-class status or citizenship on anyone either. In
other words, foes of affirmative action should stop calling on courts to engage in
an activism that they supposedly deplore. Instead they should throw their
energies behind their Civil Rights Initiatives, the constitutionality of which turns
out to go hand in hand with that of affirmative action itself.
Rubenfeld, supra note 96, at 470-71. For scholarly analyses of Proposition 209, see
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to
Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447 (1997); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209,
47 DUKE L.J. 187 (1997).
255. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
256. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
257. Id. at 701. The court stated that conventional equal protection analysis "looks to
the substance of the law at issue..." Id. Under that analysis laws classifying persons by
race are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest, while laws classifying individuals by sex are subject to heightened
scrutiny and must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. See id.
at 702 (citing, among other cases, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
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Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender,
Proposition 209 prohibits the State from classifying individuals
by race or gender. A law that prohibits the State from
classifying individuals by race or gender a fortiori does not
classify individuals by race or gender. Proposition 209's ban on
race and gender preferences, as a matter of law and logic, does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause in any conventional
258
sense.
"Impediments to preferential treatment do not deny equal
protection," the court concluded, and "[t]hat the Constitution permits
the rare race-based or gender-based preference hardly implies that
the state cannot ban them altogether.
259
As for the argument that Proposition 209 conflicted with and was
therefore preempted by Title VII, the court noted the statute's
express preemption provision.2" The proposition "does not remotely
purport to require the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII"26' since the statute provides
that nothing in that legislation "shall be interpreted to require" an
employer "to grant preferential treatment to any individual" on
account of race or sex.262 While the court is correct that the text of
Title VII does not require preferential treatment, the court failed to
ask whether Title VII, as construed and applied by the Supreme
Court, allows employers (including state employers) the discretion to
promulgate and implement voluntary affirmative action plans. As we
258. Id. The court noted but did not decide the question whether "a statewide ballot
initiative [can] deny equal protection to members of a group that constitutes a majority of
the electorate that enacted it ... Is it possible for a majority of voters impermissibly to
stack the political deck against itself?" Id. at 704. Noting that the Supreme Court has held
unconstitutional political structures denying racial minorities the right to vote on an equal
basis with others, the Ninth Circuit opined that "[w]hen the electorate votes up or down
on a referendum alleged to burden a majority of the voters" (in this case a majority
comprised of women and minorities) "it is hard to conceive how members of the majority
have been denied the right to vote." Id.
259. Id. at 707-08. See also id. at 708 ("The Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight
of the forest for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.").
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (providing that state laws inconsistent with the purpose and
any provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are preempted).
261. Coalition for Econ. Equal., 122 F.3d at 710.
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
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know, the Supreme Court answered "yes" to that query in both 1979
and 1987.263 The Ninth Circuit's approach thus ignored the Supreme
Court's settled interpretation of Title VII and rejected the contrary
view that "Congress intended to protect employers' discretion to
utilize race-conscious and gender-conscious affirmative action as a
method of complying with their obligations under Title VII.
Proposition 209, by eliminating the discretion.., contravenes this
Congressional purpose." 2' Advocates of affirmative action will face a
great if not insurmountable political and legal challenge if other
courts follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit when deciding the
constitutionality of other initiatives like or modeled on Proposition
209.
What, if anything, would or will satisfy those who wish to inter
race-conscious affirmative action measures? One alternative,
proposed by the United States in its Grutter amicus brief, is a
percentage admissions plan like those in use in Texas, California, and
Florida.265  The Texas plan, advocated by African-American and
Latino legislators with the assistance of rural white conservative
lawmakers,266 was signed into law in 1997 by then-Governor George
W. Bush.267 The plan268 provides that state residents graduating in the
263. See supra notes 54 & 66 and accompanying text.
264. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1517 (N.D. Cal.
1996), vacated, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cit. 1997).
265. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003 WL
176635 at 14-18, (No. 02-241) (Jan. 17, 2003). For a description of these percentage plans,
see Michelle Adams, Isn't It Ironic?: The Central Paradox at the Heart of "Percentage
Plans," 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1737-46 (2001).
266. See Lani Guinier, Comment: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 162-63 (2003); Gerald Torres,
Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone Ledge, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1596, 1602 (2003).
267. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2001):
Each general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant for admission
to the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant graduated with a
grade point average in the top 10 percent of the student's high school graduating
class in one of the two school years preceding the academic year for which the
applicant is applying for admission and the applicant graduated from a public or
private high school in this state accredited by a generally recognized accrediting
organization or from a high school operated by the United States Department of
Defense ....
Institutions admitting applicants pursuant to this law must "determine whether
the applicant may require additional preparation for college-level work or would benefit
from inclusion in a retention program." Id. at § 51.803(a)&(b).
268. For a criticism of the Texas plan, see Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2487, 2517-38 (2003) (book review).
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top ten percent of their high school class gain automatic admission to
any Texas state university, including the flagship University of Texas
at Austin.69 "Given the racial and economic segregation in the state's
high schools, the assumption was that blacks and Hispanics would be
given a fairer chance to enroll, without having to compete directly
with whites who lived in richer districts.""27 In California the top four
percent of high school graduates with the requisite grades in
mandated courses are automatically admitted, with applicants
continuing to compete for admission to the University of California at
Berkeley."' And Floridians graduating in the top twenty percent of
their high school class are automatically admitted to a state-run
institution of higher education, but not necessarily the one they
269. See Robert Tomsho, Texas's Race-Neutral Diversity Plan May Face Overhaul,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003, at B1. For a discussion of the Texas 10 Percent Plan, see
GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 19, at 72-74. Guinier and Torres write that the Texas
plan "was consistent ... with the idea that hard work ought to count for a lot and that
hard-working students should not be punished for the failure of politicians to meet their
state's constitutional requirement to provide equal educational opportunity within high
schools throughout the state." Id. at 72. Interestingly, "[m]any conservative rural white
legislators, recognizing that the systematic class bias in the traditional admissions
procedure has harmed their white constituents, joined in to support this populist
measure." Id. Moreover, the plan
promised to reintegrate Texas higher education and make the university more
economically diverse. With a more diverse undergraduate body to draw on, the
graduate schools would become more diverse as well. It also promised to begin a
debate about how to measure the quality of public secondary education in order
to preserve the high quality of Texas higher education. It acknowledged the
importance of drawing future leaders from all sectors of the population, not just
the affluent or well-endowed. It provided access to the flagship schools to
citizens throughout the state and not just those from the resource-rich suburbs of
Dallas, Austin, and Houston. And finally, it recognized the valuable role that the
flagship schools play in creating a network of public citizens who will serve the
state and its taxpayers and whose tax dollars provide the public subsidy that
makes the state university affordable.
Id. at 72-73.
270. Jacques Steinberg, The New Calculus Of Diversity on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 2003, at Week 3 (National Edition). See also Adams, supra note 265, at 1746-58
(discussing role of racial segregation in achieving diversity under percentage plans).
Testifying on the percentage plan legislation at a hearing before the Texas House
Committee on Higher Education, Professor Michael Olivas stated:
The 10% rank is going to be particularly efficacious in the state of Texas
ironically as a result of the extreme racial isolation of its high schools. Because of
that racial isolation, many rural and urban minority schools will have a number of
minority students in the top 10% of their class who, I believe, will have an
opportunity to be considered for admissions at flagship institutions where they
are not presently able to do so because of the lower test scores these groups tend
to present.
Adams, supra note 265, at 1739-40 (footnote omitted) (quoting Olivas testimony).
271. See Tomsho, supra note 269, at B1.
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want.272
As noted by the authors of the Texas ten percent plan (one of
whom is my colleague, Professor Michael Olivas), percentage plans in
Texas and California have not resulted in a rise in the admission rates
of African-Americans and Latinos. 3 (even though the plans have
benefited Asian-Americans).274 Undergraduate racial and ethnic
diversity at the University of Texas has returned to pre-Hopwood
levels, the current enrollment of first-time minority freshmen is
higher than pre-Hopwood numbers, and "[w]hile the percentage of
African-American and Latino/Hispanic students remain slightly lower
than pre-Hopwood levels, these numbers still represent an
improvement over the low point post-Hopwood."2" Furthermore,
and notably, the college grades of students admitted through the ten
percent plan are higher than the grades of "non-top-ten percenters"
and ten percenters "are now performing as well in college as their
non-top-ten percent counterparts who scored 200-300 points higher
on the SAT.,
216
Some have complained that percentage-plan admissions unfairly
foreclose admissions to students from largely white and affluent
suburbs, and that "minority students who would have been admitted
under affirmative action and who, based on past experience would
have succeeded" are also being rejected.7  Percentage plans "have
their own kinds of unfairness and arbitrariness," one scholar has
argued:278
In fact, they discriminate in their own way. A student who was
in the top 20 percent of an extremely demanding high school
might well have worked much harder and be much better
prepared than a student who is in the top 10 percent of an
extremely weak high school. Why should admissions offices
blind themselves to differences among high schools? Why
should students be punished for being in tough schools? Why
272. Id.
273. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Authors of the Texas Ten Percent Plan, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 2003 WL 402142, at *3 (Feb. 18, 2003) (No. 02-516).
274. See Tomsho, supra note 269, at B1; Steinberg, supra note 270, at 3. On Asian-
Americans and affirmative action, see FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA
BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 131-41 (2002).
275. Torres, supra note 266, at 1600, 1602 (footnote omitted).
276. Id. at 1604 (footnote omitted).
277. Mary Frances Berry, How Percentage Plans Keep Minority Students Out of
College, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 4,2000, at A48.
278. SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 202.
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should they benefit from being in easy ones? ... Students from
academically strong schools often have a tremendous amount to
offer, even if they did not end up in the top 10 percent.
Universities should be allowed to take this point into account.
A top 10 percent policy can be deeply unfair to applicants and
universities alike.279
Some parents in Texas, concerned that their children will not
graduate in the top ten percent of their class, have embarked on a
"new white flight" and enroll their sons and daughters at schools
where finishing at or above the magical ten percent line is more
certain, even though three in four applicants in the next decile are
admitted to the University of Texas at Austin or Texas A&M.28 °
At the University of Texas at Austin sixty-nine percent of the
2003 incoming freshman class was comprised of persons admitted
under the ten percent plan.281 "University officials have put special
caps in place to prevent 10 percenters from taking up all available
openings in the business and communications schools., 212 According
to one Texas parent, the plan "has hurt some kids who are more
qualified than the ones getting in,"'83 a complaint that was heard by
politicians who introduced a filibustered bill in the Texas legislature
limiting automatic admissions to students who took and completed a
state-recommended college-preparatory curriculum.8 As can be
seen, many are not and will never be convinced that diversity sought
through and achieved by percentage plans (which are incoherently
championed by opponents of affirmative action)28 or other devices'
279. Id. See also Guinier, supra note 266, at 167 (stating that "an automatic admissions
system based on high school grades may appear both arbitrary and backward-looking,"
arbitrary "because it uses a single criterion without investigating how that criterion applies
to individual students or is influenced by local norms, funding, and teacher qualifications,"
and "backward-looking because it chooses students based on what they did in the past:
they performed well in high school"); id. at 167 n.216 ("using grades alone disadvantages
those who attend a more competitive high school or undertake a more difficult
curriculum").
280. See Rick Casey, White Flight in Age of 10 Percent, Hous. CHRON., Sep. 5, 2003, at
25A; Marta Tienda & Sunny Niu, Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas' Top 10% Plan,
available at http://www.texastoplO.princeton.edu/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
281. See Tomsho, supra, note 269 at B4.
282. Id.
283. Id. (quoting parent).
284. See id.
285. Arguments for percentage plans by opponents of affirmative action are puzzling.
As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted: "A top 10 percent policy, or any other policy
specifically designed to promote racial diversity, should itself be unconstitutional, at least
if race-conscious policies are unconstitutional too." SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 203. "It
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are "fair" and recognize and reward "merit" (with "merit" defined as
and limited to grade point average and standardized test scores).287
Thus, the too-many-minorities and racegoating dynamics will
continue to be a significant part of the text and the subtext of the
ongoing affirmative action debate. The concern some have that
affirmative action results in the admission of undeserving and
unqualified or underqualified minorities is often based on the
argument that colleges and universities have improperly departed
from the notion of "merit" noted in the preceding paragraph. One
would think that those who are troubled by this departure would also
be troubled by other admissions decisions based on or influenced by
factors other than test scores and GPAs, such as athletic prowess,'
but, as Professor Ruth Colker has pointed out, "Americans...
is incoherent to contend that because race-neutral methods might promote racial diversity,
race-conscious affirmative action programs are unacceptable." Id.
286. In 2001 the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law established a
Critical Race Studies program. According to a newspaper account, applicants expressing
an interest in the program enjoyed a preference in admissions, and the program "has
helped the law school increase its enrollment of black first-year students to 13 in 2002
from five in 2000-out of a class of 305 each year. Black enrollment is still less than in 1996,
the last year affirmative action was allowed in California." Further, twelve of twenty-
three students receiving programmatic admissions in 2002 were African-American,
Hispanic, or Native-American. Daniel Golden, Schools Find Ways To Achieve Diversity
Without Key Tool, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003, at Al. One UCLA Law School professor
has described the Critical Race Studies program as "very unhealthy" and "legally suspect"
and does "not believe the solution is to find ways to rig the application process so that very
small numbers of underrepresented minorities with weak academic qualifications are
admitted through the back door." Id. at AS.
287. Not all agree with this definition of merit. "Test scores and grades are useful
measures of the ability to do good work, but they are no more than that. They are far
from infallible indicators of other qualities some might regard as intrinsic, such as a deep
love of learning or a capacity for high academic achievement." BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 16, at 277. Interestingly, "Martin Luther King, Jr., now regarded as one of the
greatest orators of this century, scored in the bottom half of all test-takers on the verbal
GRE .. " Id. at 277 n.1 (citation omitted).
288. As one editorial put it:
[I]f affirmative action, quotas, and racial preferences are wrong, then so are
scholarships awarded to athletes whose grades and SAT scores would not
otherwise qualify them for admission. The NCAA's minimums usually fall far
below the academic requirements for regular students-particularly at schools
that brag about their reputations for integrity and excellence.
Punt, Editorial, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 2002, at F2. "We wonder-how
many of affirmative action's loudest critics would support the end of preferences if that
meant the disbanding of a bowl-bound football team?" Id.. See also Karen W. Arenson,
Study of Elite Colleges Find Athletes Are Isolated From Classmates, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 15,
2003, at A12 (National Edition) (athletes recruited to elite colleges and universities "were
admitted with significantly lower grades and College Board scores and then performed
more poorly than would be expected for students with those grades and scores").
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believe that racial minorities were the only group sometimes to gain
admissions without meeting such objective criteria. 219
In worrying about too many minorities and searching for
racegoats, some opponents of affirmative action have not expressed
similar concern or outrage over legacy preferences afforded relatives
of alumni,2" including the children of Supreme Court Justices29' and
the son of a President of the United States (who also became
President).29 2 Legacy preferences overwhelmingly favor whites2 3 and
can make a significant difference for applicants. For example,
Harvard admits forty percent of its legacy applicants (the general
acceptance rate is eleven percent), Princeton's legacy admission rate
is thirty-five percent (eleven percent for all other applicants), and
forty-one percent of legacy applicants to the University of
Pennsylvania are admitted as compared with a twenty-one percent
rate for non-legacy applicants. Professor Jody Armour has written
289. COLKER, supra note 3, at 34.
290. "While tirades against affirmative action regularly fill the pages of magazines and
newspapers, the most disturbing form of affirmative action-preference given to children of
alumni, known as 'legacies' - is usually ignored by critics." Id. (footnote omitted). It
should be noted that Justice Thomas did refer to this practice in his dissent in Grutter. See
supra note 151 and accompanying text. See also LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 35,
at 128 (discussing legacy preferences).
It should be noted that Texas A&M University, subsequent to its decision to not
consider race in admissions, see supra note 243, abolished its preferential admissions policy
for legacies. See John Brittain, Michael Olivas & State Sen. Rodney Ellis, Now Aggies
need to take the next step, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2004, at 1C; Greg Winter, Texas A&M
Ban on "Legacies" Fuels Debate on Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at A16
(National Edition).
291. Justice Breyer's father attended Stanford University, as did Breyer and his son.
Justice Kennedy, two of his sons, and one daughter attended Stanford, as did Justice
O'Connor and two of her children. Justice Stevens, like his father, attended the
University of Chicago and Northwestern Law School, with four of his nephews and nieces
attending Chicago. And Justice Ginsburg and her daughter attended Harvard Law
School. See Daniel Golden, For Supreme Court, Affirmative Action Isn't Just Academic,
WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at Al.
292. See Maureen Dowd, The Class President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at A23
(National Edition) (noting that President George W. Bush was admitted to Yale as a
legacy).
293. See Buchanan, supra note 19, at 164 ("Past societal discrimination ... causes
alumni and family connection criteria to work presently to the advantage of white
applicants."). "At the University of Virginia, 91% of legacy applicants accepted on an
early-decision basis for next fall are white; 1.6% are black, 0.5% are Hispanic, and 1.6%
are Asian. Among applicants with no alumni parents, the pool of those accepted is more
diverse: 73% white, 5.6% black, 9.3% Asian and 3.5% Hispanic." Daniel Golden,
Preference for Alumni Children In College Admission Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2003, at A2.
294. Golden, supra note 293, at Al. A Harvard admissions officer has stated that the
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about the legacy applicant to Amherst who was deemed to be "a dull
kid" but was considered because she was an "a.d.," an "alumni
daughter." '295 Even though legacy admissions constitute a form of
racial and ethnic nepotism,296 many do not see it that way, for "the
public perception of admissions policies is filtered through a racist
lens. When the group that is targeted for assistance shifts from a
predominantly white male economic elite to an African-American
subclass, the public takes notice and complains about the derogation
of the merit principle."297 In other words, some members of the public
see and will continue to see too many minorities and will question
whether those persons of color are entitled to, and should be in,
certain spaces and places.
VI. CONCLUSION
As I was redrafting and finalizing this article, I read with great
interest a newspaper account of a bake sale held by a conservative
student group at Southern Methodist University protesting the
consideration of race and gender in college admissions. Cookies
could be purchased by white males for one dollar; by white women
for seventy five cents; by Hispanics for fifty cents; and by African-
Americans for twenty-five cents. "8 Contending that the sale could
have created an unsafe situation, the university shut it down, with the
average SAT score of its admitted legacy applicants is two points below the overall
average of admittees, with legacy status used to break ties between comparable applicants.
Id. at A2. One admitted legacy applicant at Harvard had SAT scores lower than the
scores of approximately seventy-five percent of her classmates. Id. at Al.
295. Jody David Armour, Hype and Reality in Affirmative Action, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1173, 1197-98 (1997).
296. Nepotism "can conflict with the principles of equal opportunity .... STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 246 (2002).
"To African Americans, nepotism is tantamount to racism, since favoritism toward
whites-whether related to oneself or not-is morally no different from discrimination
against blacks. That is why proponents of affirmative action often say that whites
hypocritically deny to blacks what they practice themselves as a matter of course." ADAM
BELLOW, IN PRAISE OF NEPOTISM: A NATURAL HISTORY 13 (2003). "[A]ffirmative
action ... pit[s] ethnic identity groups against one another, suggesting that even in
America the claims of ethnic nepotism have yet to be transcended .... Id. at 18; see also
DERRICK B ELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
56 (1992) ("terms like 'merit' and 'best qualified' are infinitely manipulable if and when
whites must explain why they reject blacks to hire 'relatives'-even when the only
relationship is that of race").
297. COLKER, supra note 3, at 35.
298. See Linda K. Wertheimer, Dallas University Halts Race-Based Bake Sale, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sep. 25, 2003, available at 2003 WL73116441.
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group recording only $1.50 in sales. 9' Of the many interesting aspects
of the sale and the university's actions in stopping it, a statement
made by the executive director and former chapter officer of the
protesting group caught my eye; as they stated in an op-ed piece,
"affirmative action creates a hostile environment wherever it is used.
The hostility is often latent, but it is never far from the surface .... "'
That statement confirms, illustrates and illuminates, perhaps better
than pages of legal analysis and commentary ever could, the
resentment and angst felt by many opponents of affirmative action
when they observe minority students or employees or government
contractors. These feelings and dynamics of the anti-affirmative-
action position will continue to be a significant part of the legal and
public policy debate in the wake of Grutter.
299. See Bake Sale Targets Affirmative Action, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 26, 2003, at 43; SMU
Bake Sale Offends Some, Hous. CHRON., Sep. 26, 2003, at 27.
300. Matthew J. Griffing & Beth Henary, Editorial, Shutdown of Bake Sale at SMU
Half-baked, HOUS. CHRON., Sep. 29, 2003, at 19A.
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APPENDIX
The following point system used to rate applicants for
undergraduate admissions to the University of Michigan was
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Gratz:3 '
GPA HIGH SCHOOL QUALITY
Score Points Score Points
2.0 40 0 0
2.1 42 1 2
2.2 44 2 4
2.3 46 3 6
2.4 48 4 8
2.5 50 5 10
2.6 52
2.7 54
2.8 56 DIFFICULTY OF CURRICULUM
2.9 58 Score Points
3.0 60 -2 -4
3.1 62 -1 -2
3.2 64 0 0
3.3 66 1 2
3.4 68 2 4
3.5 70 3 6











301. See Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, What's at Stake, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27,
2003, at 34.
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Legacy (parents, stepparents) 4
















Identification or education 20
Men in nursing 5
Scholarship athlete 20
Provost's discretion 20
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